

ALIENATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LOYALTY IN AFRICA

Dipo Irele

University of Ibadan, Nigeria

บทคัดย่อ

ปัญหาเรื่องความจงรักภักดีมีความสำคัญอย่างยิ่งในการทำความเข้าใจเกี่ยวกับวิกฤติการณ์ของการเป็นประเทศรัฐในแอฟริกาภายหลังยุคอาณานิคม บทความนี้จะตรวจสอบเหตุผลว่าทำไมผู้คนจึงมีความผูกพันกับชนเผ่าของตนเอง แทนที่จะผูกพันกับรัฐชาติ ตอนแรกบทความจะวิเคราะห์เรื่องความจงรักภักดีของผู้คน และจุดอ่อนของรัฐที่จะดึงดูดพลเมืองของตนเอง ตอนที่สองจะเป็นการนำเอาทฤษฎีมติเอกฉันท์ของรอว์ลส์มาใช้ เพื่อแสดงให้เห็นว่า หลักการต่าง ๆ สามารถเป็นที่ยอมรับกันได้เพื่อสร้างพื้นฐานของศีลธรรมทางสังคม

Abstract

The problem of loyalty is important for understanding the crisis of the nation-state in postcolonial Africa. This paper examines the reason why people are attached to their ethnic units rather than the nation-state. In the first part it analyzes loyalty and the weakness of the state in attracting it. The second part it uses Rawls' theory of overlapping consensus to show how certain principles can be agreed upon which would form the basis of social morality.

Since independence many African countries have been bedeviled with the problem of the loyalty of their citizens. The problem of loyalty has been ascribed to the primordial attachment which people have for their ethnic units which has precluded them to have loyalty to the nation-state.¹ In fact weaving together the heterogeneous ethnic groups in Africa has become a critical problem in most African states.¹ In this paper, I shall

dwell on the reason why the people are attached to their ethnic unit rather than the nation-state. In the first part I shall analyze loyalty and then go on to proffer reasons why the citizens of most of African countries have not willingly given their loyalty to the nation. In the second part, I argue that there is the need to have an agreement or consensus on certain basic principles. I utilize Rawls' theory of overlapping consensus to sketch how an agreement could be reached embodying certain principles which would form the basis of social morality.

In a stimulating paper, Oldenquist argues that loyalty is different from fanaticism.² He contends that loyalty is not a bias or bigotry. He goes on to argue that loyalty exhibits certain characteristic features which are different from bias and bigotry.³ Although loyalty can degenerate into fanaticism or bigotry, it does not necessarily have the features of fanaticism because loyalty to one's country is predicated on rational assessment of one's country. He claims that in the case of fanatical loyalty to one's country this "is usually dependent on ignorance" and "can be rationally faulted".⁴ This kind of loyalty depends on emotional and ideological appeals. Oldenquist contends further that our loyalty to a country depends on certain benefits and protections that the country provides for its citizens.⁵ In other words, our loyalty to a country is predicated on certain basic needs the country can provide for its citizens.

Oldenquist further argues that there is a relationship between loyalty and shared moral values. According to him, loyalty presupposes shared values which the citizens have as background norms. In any society, these shared values define the common good and adjudicate among competing claims of different groups.⁶ These shared values are also important because, according to Oldenquist, they define the moral community.

Oldenquist further claims that these shared values or, what he calls at times, "social morality", must have the feature of universalization. The basic tenet of universalization is that moral language is reasonable. When we say that something is good, for example, we must have in mind some features of that thing in virtues of which we hold it to be good. Furthermore, our judgment must be universalizable. That is, whatever our reason may be for holding that 'X' is good, it must be such that we would agree that anything else like 'X' with respect to that reason would also be good. If I say that my child is good, I must have a reason for saying so,

and if this is the case, any child that has the same characteristics as my child would also be a good child. In other words, I am committed to the view that any child that exhibits that same characteristics as my child ought to be a good child.

The interpretation I have given above of universalization might not have caught the essence of this metaethical theory properly. But we can get the crux of the tenet of universalization by adapting Hare's suggestion for our purpose.⁷ Someone might claim that the assertion, "all children with blonde hair ought to be protected" is universalizable if and only if there is a type of action O such that (i) the person believes that "all children with blonde hair ought to be protected" is for the type O, (ii) the person accepts the general principle the actions of type O are obligatory, (iii) this general principle can be formulated without using proper names or personal names or personal pronouns. This can be formulated thus:

U: You ought to do O = if there is action O and A falls within action O and A ought to be done.

Or it could be put thus, taking over Nagel's conception of objective reasons: (p(x) (Px) ought to do x) where the property must contain an occurrence of the variable p which is bound only by the universal quantification which governs the entire formula.⁸ The person who made this assertion if she were to be consistent would agree that she is also duty bound to abide by the principle. She cannot require others to abide by this principle while she excuses herself from this requirement. Thus the universalization theory yields something like the golden rule.

However, another person might adopt a principle that is different. She might claim that everyone has a similar non-universalisable obligation to protect her own child which is more fundamental than protecting other people's children. This case is similar to the more familiar case of egoism or fanaticism. An egoist would claim that she ought to perform an act if and only if it would maximize her benefits. This can be put starkly in this schema:

E: An act is morally right if and only if it maximizes my benefits.

Thus the egoist does not perform an act to benefit others however similar other people would be to her because it is not a matter of similarities. Like its twin sister, egoism issues in absurdity: it cannot be consistently held.

Oldenquist has pointed out that normative judgments based on egoism and those based on loyalty at times, share the same uneliminable egocentric characteristics or, put differently, individualistic hedonism.⁹ They are based on self-dependent normative judgements.¹⁰ If I say I love my country, I am claiming that there is a putative loyalty to my country. But if I replace my country with a characterizing expression which is peculiar to me only, I have an egoistic ideal, not loyalty. As Oldenquist says, “What I am committed to is a kind of thing, not some particular things”.¹¹ In other words, there are no certain features which others could share with me. But if I am willing to replace my country with any characteristic expression which others share with me, I have a genuine loyalty and not an ideal; my normative judgment is not individualistic.

As I have pointed out above, an egoist does not recognize similarities, hence he cannot replicate himself. This, according to Oldenquist, is what separates his position from that of shared social morality. He is inclined towards an entity only by means of a singular term.¹² But he cannot replicate the singular term. He cannot say he values this more than that because there will be no intelligible ground for him to decide which of them he favours. He will favour himself and then the confusion that attends his “favouring ‘this’ or ‘that’ sets in”.¹³ This equally characterizes, at times, a person with a banal form of loyalty because his loyalty is self-dependent. He cannot employ any general feature in characterizing his loyalty, it must be ‘my group’, and this becomes meaningful to him alone; hence he lives in a solipsistic world.¹⁴

Loyalty, according to Oldenquist, is an object of noninstrumental value in virtue of having certain characteristic features which appeal to all people. In general, people care about the object of their loyalty and they acknowledge obligations towards it, which they would not feel towards any object which they do not have loyalty to. Loyalty, as earlier pointed out, towards an object could be shared by a number of people unlike object of pure self-interest. In this regard, we talk about “our country”, and not just ‘my country’.¹⁵ What distinguishes this from pure egoism is

that there is a shared value or social value.¹⁶ I shall return to this issue of shared value later.

The foregoing, I trust, would have given something of the flavour of Oldenquist's position on loyalty even though I have had to give only the barest sketch of it and sacrifice much of the more detailed analysis. What emerges from the discussion is that there must be a shared value or social morality before we can have loyalty towards a nation.

The overwhelming consensus on loyalty in Africa is that the nation-states in Africa have not been able to secure the loyalty of their citizens. Rather their loyalty has been to their ethnic groups and this has led to political instability in most African countries.¹⁷ This ethnic loyalty or primordial sentiment, it is claimed, started with colonialism and the colonialists played this up in order to pursue their strategy of divide and rule.¹⁸ The nation-states that emerged after colonialism have not been able to weld these disparate ethnic groups together into a cohesive nation. Further the elites in these states in Africa after colonialism have also played the issue of ethnicity up in order to have access to power.¹⁹ In other words, they have manipulated the issue of ethnicity in order to protect their vested interest.

As I pointed out above, some scholars believe that the integration of these ethnic groups into nation-states in Africa and the loyalty of the citizens to these states have become difficult to achieve. They believe that national integration and loyalty could be achieved only in a homogenous society. In other words, a state with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds would find it impossible to achieve national integration and have the loyalty of its citizens. This conception of a nation seems to me to be in line with Friedrich Herder's conception of it. This older romantic belief is that before we can have a nation the people must have the same language and share the same common ethnic origin.²⁰ I wish to state that this Herderian conception of a nation seems to me inadequate. A nation, according to Benedict Anderson, is imagined; it is a fiction.²¹ So, except perhaps for a face-to-face community, there cannot be a nation which completely satisfies Herder's definition. This definition of nation is therefore not complete because it describes only homogeneous communities. One may ask, cannot heterogeneous communities constitute a nation? I think we can supplement our conception of a nation by stipulating that

multiple ethnic groups can constitute a nation if they are brought together on the basis of mutual consent based on certain principles or shared values. I shall return to this later. I need to add that the existence in a nation of much cultural and linguistic diversity has been an historical fact. Cultural and linguistic heterogeneity has been far more common to political units than homogeneity. Indeed heterogeneity has been a factor favoring political, social, economic and cultural development. The existence of diversity in a nation should not be a problem. The reason militating against loyalty and national integration in Africa has to be sought elsewhere.

What has emerged from the above consideration is that a nation may be made up of an aggregate of persons not belonging to the same linguistic and cultural groups but they should be held together by mutual consent and agreement.

Most African countries with different groups were legislated into existence by the colonial powers in different African countries. The constitution imposed on the people, for example in Nigeria, from the colonial period to the present one did not enjoy widespread acceptance among the different ethnic groups. This points to the fact that there was no prior agreement on certain fundamental issues which could have reflected in the constitution. This has been the reason why the citizens have been alienated from the state and their loyalty has been to their ethnic groups.

In a perceptive paper, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement”, Professor Peter Ekeh explains the dynamics that have militated against loyalty in Africa.²² Ekeh contends that there are two public realms in African social and political universe. He characterizes one of the realms as primordial and the other civic. He claims that the primordial is the “communal” or “sectional” and this is identified with “the primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities. . . .”²³ He goes on to say that “the primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperative as the private realm”.²⁴ On the other hand, the civil realm “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private and in the primordial public”.²⁵ There is a sense of belonging to the primordial, while the civil realm lacks this sense of belonging. He claims further that the civic public derives from the colonial administration and “has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa”.²⁶ According to him, it is grounded in civil structures: the military, the civil

service, the police etc. Ekeh points out that the individual is linked morally with the primordial realm: “he sees his duties as moral obligations to benefit and sustain a primordial public of which he is a member”.²⁷

The individual does not think he has to benefit from the primordial realm. Ekeh says that the concept of citizenship in Europe in which rights and duties of the citizens are structured does not operate in the African context in terms of the civic realm. In this realm, there is no duty corresponding to right hence the individual does not have any sense of obligation or duty to the civic realm. Indeed, the attitude to the civic realm is measured in material terms. As he puts it, “while the individual seeks to gain from the civic public, there is no moral urge on him to give back to the civic public in return for his benefits”.²⁸ In other words, there is no corresponding duty to the right which the citizens get from the civic public. There is no moral urge in the citizens to give back to the state. In short, the civic public is amoral. In fact, there is the urge to exploit the civic public for the benefit of his/her primordial group since there is no sense of belonging. Ekeh has put it graphically: “The individual seizes largess from the civic public in order to benefit the primordial public”.²⁹ Ekeh then goes on to point out the negative effects this has had on the political process in Africa – corruption and lack of loyalty to the wider political unit. Ekeh believes that the civic public needs social morality.

It should be pointed out again that Ekeh's analysis is highly illuminating and it brings out one important point which has been mentioned earlier. This is that loyalty depends on social values or social morality which must be the guiding principle in the nation. Besides, the citizens' basic needs have to be catered for. I shall come back to this issue presently but before that I wish to point out that Ekeh's position does not square with certain facts with the present reality of African politics. It is not the case that individuals seize largess from the civic public and benefit their primordial groups. The truth of the case is that individuals seize from the civic public without benefiting their ethnic groups. As previously pointed out, the ruling elite in Africa use the primordial sentiment when it suits them to protect their vested interest.

The various strifes in many African countries had ethnic colouration. The civil war in Nigeria was as a result of this. The recent conflict in Kenya after the elections has ethnic colouration. The Ivorian, Rwandan,

Liberian, Sierra Leonean conflicts and to some extent the conflicts in Somalia and Darfur were and are ethnically motivated.

Ekeh's analysis of citizenship has to be deepened by bringing it up to date to accommodate the existing reality in Africa.

The discourse on citizenship has had a long history,³⁰ but it is in recent times that the discourse has become more important due to certain events in the world: the democratization experiment in Eastern Europe, parts of Africa and Latin America; the rise of vicious ethnic and national conflicts, especially in Africa. These events have thrown up challenges to the discourse of citizenship and various views have been expressed.³¹ In the specific case of Africa, the multi-ethnic nature of many African states has made the theme of citizenship an urgent one in recent years. The ethnic groups conceive each other as the Other and there is what could be termed the politics of difference in these African states. In what follows I will discuss the concept of citizenship within this context. I need to point out that the discourse of citizenship has to be reconfigured to accommodate the situation in African multi-ethnic states.

The problem of citizenship could be traced to colonialism. Although the idea of citizenship in the colonial period in most multi-ethnic African countries was grounded on the liberal idea of individual rights. Colonialism promoted the politics of difference through its policy of divide and rule. This brought about tension in the post – colonial African states since politics was rooted on ethnic lines. The predominant ethnic groups marginalized the smaller ones and this led to agitations for group rights rather than individual rights. This demand for group rights has brought into the fore another dimension to the discourse of citizenship.

The discourse of citizenship in its liberal variant gives priority to the individual rights: the individual has rights which are sacrosanct, and which the state cannot infringe upon. From the earlier social contractalists – though Rousseau might be an exception – to Rawls and the British sociologist Marshall, to some extent, the emphasis has always been on the rights of the individual as a citizen of a political community.³² Despite the merit of Marshall's work in extending the rights – civic and political – to include social rights the focus of his work on citizenship is still the individual rights.³³

The liberal conception of citizenship rights has to be reconfigured

in such a way that social institutions have to be refashioned that allow or accommodate the distinctiveness of each ethnic group. In this way of conceptualizing citizenship rights, these rights are not only bestowed on individuals as found in the liberal perspective but on ethnic groups as well in the state. These rights which would be conferred on ethnic groups would be a recognition of the diversity or the plural nature of the state, and will lead to an inclusive politics. This could be termed a fourth citizenship right – that is, extending the Marshallian three scheme rights of civil, political and social rights. I shall still come to this issue when I discuss Rawls's overlapping consensus.³⁴

Let me quickly traverse the terrain we have covered so far. The analysis of loyalty has shown that loyalty has to depend on certain social values or social morality which defines certain principles which guide the conduct of the citizens. It is in this connection that I have pointed out that a nation which has these principles which are universalisable would have the loyalty of its citizens. The most tragic dilemma of our time is how we can bring about or fashion certain principles and norms, social values (or social morality) which are binding on all citizens. Colonialism succeeded in utterly destroying the traditional social values (or consensus) without succeeding in laying new foundation of any new social value or social morality, which is why in most African countries it has been difficult to have loyalty of the citizens.

Furthermore, the citizens in most African countries see the state in a praetorian fashion. Hence they are alienated from the government. The state does not seem to care for them and thus they see it as a hostile force. In other words, they do not derive any benefits from the state. They see the state as an aggressive and oppressive one hence they are alienated from it and seek the solace of their ethnic groups. Since the basic functions of the state which are protection and security of its citizens have been eroded, and ethnically based militias have taken over and the territorial state has become “a universe of negativity”. In some African states, the state has collapsed. Thus, the difficulty in eliciting the loyalty of the people lies in the alienating nature of the social system. So let me turn now to the concept of alienation.

There are many definitions of alienation which, as Lukes has pointed out, “have achieved considerably and widespread contemporary

currency”.³⁵ But it was through the work of Marx that alienation became fixed in contemporary consciousness.³⁶ Alienation, for Marx, occurs when the products and creations – all those things that are extensions of man’s personality which should serve to enrich him – are controlled by external forces. They acquire an independent life of their own and they dominate him. In its consummate form (i.e. in capitalist society), alienation takes place in four ways:

1. Man is alienated from his own products
2. Man is alienated from other men through the competitive nature of the economic system which is based on private property
3. Man is alienated from nature, a thing that should have enriched his creative power
4. Man is alienated from society, which expresses a collective power that oppresses him.

We can extend the concept of alienation to cover the phenomenon of loyalty. Let us say provisionally that someone is alienated from an object (A) (a country) when, given his situation, he would normally have expected to show a sense of loyalty towards A (the country) but in fact does not. He will normally be expected to show a sense of loyalty to that object (A) (a country); that is if he lives within a defined geographical boundary. But if he is alienated he does not view the country as his own, and as a result does not care much about what happens to it.

Anything that one is loyal to he can also be alienated from. If I come to view an object as mine I feel ashamed about it if it deteriorates, and hence I can be alienated from it. I have this feeling because I have created a link between myself and the object which I see as being worthy of my loyalty. On the other hand absence of any feeling toward an object which one should, in a normal situation, have a feeling for could also be a sign of alienation.

There are some casual conditions that normally create loyalty and lead us to expect it, and of alienation as undesirable state of affair which exists when these conditions are not present. When do we expect loyalty, or, what are the conditions that foster loyalty in a nation? It is difficult to

answer the question in a neat manner, but it is easy to say when people could be alienated and hence not loyal to their nation.

In these later regard, I'll say that loyalty does not occur in a vacuum. People would expect a government to be responsive to their minimal needs before their loyalty could be won. Furthermore, people would wish to see that they participate in the decision process which affects their lives, that is not seeing the government in a praetorian fashion, to repeat this phrase again. The elites in most African countries have turned the state into their fiefdom and have pauperized their citizens.³⁷

Moreover I pointed out earlier that there are no social values (or social morality) which would be a guiding principle in African social system. The constitutions of most African countries that should embody social values have in fact been fashioned in such a way that they do not possess any such thing. There is, therefore, the need to evolve new guiding principles which define the rights and duties of the citizens as well as the various groups within the social system. These principles would have to be by mutual consent of various interest groups as well as ethnic groups and would be the basic principles which would animate the public interest and promote the public good rather than the interest of a few elites.³⁸ There should be a consensus on these principles – indeed they have to consist of what I would call overlapping consensus, to borrow Rawls's phrase.³⁹

Rawls in his book, *Political Liberalism*, develops the idea of overlapping consensus which is an extension of his seminal work, *A Theory of Justice*.⁴⁰ I want to utilize his view of overlapping consensus to see how we can have an agreement on some basic principles which will bring about a sense of belonging of all the various groups and individuals in the polity. I need to say that Rawls's theory is specifically addressed to liberal democratic societies but I believe that his theory has relevance to African situation since most African states are also evolving or trying to adopt a proper democratic system in Africa.

Roughly speaking, Rawls's account of overlapping consensus centers on how agreement could be achieved in a society with divergent views. An overlapping consensus is an agreement on central political, social and economic issues by individuals and groups who subscribe to conflicting comprehensive moral, religious, economic, social and political views.

Rawls says that a comprehensive view, like many moral or religious views, contains direct answers to difficult and controversial questions, such as what is of value in human life?, and what is the nature of the good society?⁴¹

Again Rawls says a comprehensive view “covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought”.⁴² Rawls believes that in an appropriate setting (original position) proponents of divergent comprehensive views would accept a common set of political precepts, although they would be approached in different ways. This, according to him, is possible if there are intuitive ideas that appeal to the different proponents of these comprehensive views. In order to have an overlapping consensus, Rawls believes, there should be a shared principle of toleration. Through the adoption of the principle of toleration different views can be harmonized and an overlapping consensus reached among the proponents of different views. Rawls argues that the overlapping consensus must be acceptable to the members of the society. He claims that members of the society striving to achieve an overlapping consensus must be ready to revise their views on some controversial issues since they will adhere to the principle of toleration and strain of commitment.

This is supported by the principle of reflective equilibrium discussed in *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls claims that dialogue is Socratic in nature. He argues that our views are justified by being shown to fit into an integrated web of beliefs and principles. Through reflective equilibrium, participants in a dialogue try to achieve consistency between their principles and specific cases to which the principles apply. To achieve equilibrium they must revise their principles if they do not fit into particular web of beliefs of which they are certain. They shuttle back and forth until there is an equilibrium among the various principles.

Though the overall focus of Rawls's theory is individual's rights, these individuals would share the virtue of cooperation that would allow them to have a bond between themselves. There will be social unity and they will share the same conception of justice through the overlapping consensus that has been reached.

This summary omits many details of Rawls account but should be adequate for our purposes though there are objections which could be

pressed against Rawls which I cannot go into here since they are beyond the scope of this paper.⁴³ If the different ethnic groups and other divergent groups could adopt this Socratic method then an agreement could emerge and consensus reached over principles which would lay down the social values of the state. The rights and duties of the citizens would be defined. Additionally, the duty of the state would be defined vis-?-vis its citizens and its various ethnic groups. In this way the state would no longer be seen as a hostile force by the people and the tendency to look to one's ethnic group for protection would disappear. Further, the domination or hegemony of one ethnic group over others would disappear and the fierce contest for state power between the different ethnic groups would also be eliminated since there would be an equality of opportunity and equitable sharing of rewards and burdens in the society among the different groups either ethnic or individual groups. In short, the agreement would embody social values (or social morality), and these would be the guiding principles in the society. The alienating social system that makes loyalty to the state a mirage would be replaced with a humane system that caters for the citizens.

Let me conclude by noting that the solution proffered here is a magical panacea or single solution which can solve all problems pertaining to ethnic conflicts in Africa. Neither will it bring about utopian harmony amongst the different ethnic groups but it is considered simply as a way of negotiating and dealing with ethnic differences and conflicts in a constructive manner.⁴⁴

Endnotes

¹Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh & W. Kymlicka (eds). See the text *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004) for the papers on this issue; see also Tunde Zack-Williams, "African Leadership, Nationstate and the Weberian Project", *The Constitution*, vol. 8, no. 1, March 2008; Patrick Chabal and Jean - Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. (Oxford: James Currey; Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 17-30; Michael Bratton and Nicholas van Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa; Regime Transition in Comparative perspective*. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1977).

²A. Oldenquist, "Loyalties' *Journal of Philosophy*", Vol. LXXXIX, No 4,

April 1982, pp. 173-193. I have also gained a lot from the work of S. Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); See also M. C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in J. Cohen (ed.) *For Love of Country* (Boston: Beacon Press, (1966).

³Oldenquist, op. cit, p.178: for this point see also M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1994; see also Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002.

⁴Oldenquist, p.177, see also S. Keller, op. cit.

⁵Oldenquist, p.184.

⁶Ibid, p. 178.

⁷R. M. Hare, “Universalizability”, *Proceedings on the Aristotelian Society*, pp. 295-312. See also his books, *The Language of Morals*, (Oxford: OUP, 1964); *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: OUP, 1965).

⁸T. Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Oxford: OUP, 1974).

⁹A. Oldenquist, op. cit, p. 175.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid, p.176.

¹⁷For this view see, P. Ekeh, “Citizenship and Political Conflict” in J. Okpaku (ed), *Dilemma of Nationhood* (N. Y.: NOK Press,). 1974.

¹⁸For this line of position, see O. Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980); see also Tunde Zack - Williams, op. cit.

¹⁹P. C. Rosenblatt, “Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism and Nationalism”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1964. Cf also Calhoun, op. cit.

²⁰For a lucid elaboration of Herder’s position, see J. Plamenatz, “Two types of Nationalism” in Nationalism, E. Kamenka (ed) (London: E. Arnold, 1976), pp. 24-47; cf also Calhoun op. cit. see also John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith, *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

²¹I am inclined towards Anderson’s position that any nation is an imagined community. For this position, see B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

²²P. Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 117, No. 1, 1975.

²³Ibid, p.92.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid, p. 106.

²⁸Ibid, p. 107.

²⁹Ibid, p. 110.

³⁰For an historical trajectory of the concept of citizenship, see, J.G.A. Pocock, "The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times". *Queens Quarterly* no.1, 1999; see also Gerard Delanty, *Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics* (Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000); see also Said Adejumobi, "Identity, Citizenship and Conflict" in W.A Fawole and Charles Ukeje, *The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict* (Dakar: Codestria, 2005).

³¹There are liberal, communitarian and radical views on the concept of citizenship. For an analysis of these various views, see G. Delanty, op. cit.; see also Macedo's text, *Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) for a perceptive view on the issue of citizenship.

³²See, J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1971), Pars. 1, 68; *Political Liberalism* (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1993); T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

³³For a survey and evaluation of his work, see J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988).

³⁴I have relied and appropriated some of the ideas from Will Kymlicka's text, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); For a similar position, see Partha Chatterjee, "Religious Minorities and the Secular State: Reflections on an Indian Impasse" *Public Culture*. Vol. 8, no. 1.1995.

³⁵S. Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie" in *Philosophy, Politics and Society* in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1975).

³⁶K. Marx, *Early Writings* (London: Penguin, 1978).

³⁷For the failure of leadership in most African countries, see, Chinua Achebe, *The Trouble with Nigeria* (London: Heinemann, 1993); see also these texts which give vivid accounts of how the elites have behaved in most African countries, Jean -Fran?ois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (London: Longman, 1993); B. Ayittey, *Africa Betrayed* (N. Y.: St. Martins Press, 1992); Jean-Fran?ois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2006), see especially chapter 5; see also some papers in *Africa Now* S. Ellis (ed) (Oxford: James Curry Ltd, 1997). I need to add here that there is massive corruption perpetuated by the elites in most African countries; for this see P. Bond, *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2006), Chapter 5. cf. also Tunde Zack-Williams. Op.cit.

³⁸I am quite conscious of the ambiguity of the concept of public interest. For an interesting analysis of the concept see, Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (N.

Y: Humanities Press, 1965).

³⁹For an elaboration of this idea, see John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (N. Y.: Columbia Press, 1996), pp. 133-168; For a position along the same line, see David Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); See also Brian Barry, *Justice as Impartiality*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); John Rawls (Oxford: OUP, pp. 60-77.

⁴⁰J Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁴¹J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 134.

⁴²Ibid. p. 152.

⁴³I cannot go into the various objections here but for some objections see Brian Barry's text; op. cit. Rawls's version of original position has been improved upon by T. M. Scanlon. For Scanlonian text, see, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism", in A. Sen. and B. Williams (eds), *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). and also *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* in S. Freeman (eds), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a critique of Rawls from a radical perspective in recent times see Suman Gupta, *The Theory and Reality of Democracy* (London & N. Y.: Continuum, 2006).

*I wish to thank Prof. Abiola Irele of Harvard University, U.S.A for his comments and suggestions which have improved the paper and members of the Premiere Circle – group of scholars and writers - at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria – for their comments on the paper when it was presented at the group's seminar.

⁴⁴For another position that could help in solving ethnic strife in Africa see the text of Kwasi Wiredu, "Democracy and Consensus" in *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1996).