

READING LEVINAS ON ‘THE OTHER’ FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE¹

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the meaning of Levinas’ ‘the other’, and the relation between this and the Christian teaching about the other. Levinas and the theme of ‘the other’ have been discussed among many thinkers, yet its meaning remains elusive. Levinas’ works are still open to new interpretations from readers. As one of Levinas’ readers, I want to translate Levinas’ ‘the other’ into the concrete person – the neighbor. By this translation of ‘the other’ to ‘the neighbor,’ I see a possibility of how to relate Levinas’ thought to the teaching of Christianity concerning the neighbor. I will also discuss the need of being ready to *respond responsibly* to the call of the other, our neighbor.

I

Reading Levinas’ texts always compels readers to question whether they have understood him correctly. Levinas’ philosophy always remains open for different interpretations, or to use Gadamer’s words: “All reading that is understanding is always a kind of reproduction and interpretation” (Gadamer, 1975, p.142). This, for Colin Davis, is called “Levinas effect” which means “the ability of the Levinasian text to appear differently to each of its readers” (Davis, 1996, p.140). For Peperzak, “his writings force us to a discussion through which our own thought and action can be renewed” (Peperzak, 2000, p.184). I am just one of many readers of Levinas’ texts, and I expect that my reading Levinas’ the other in Christian context will take place, as in Gadamer’s words, and open for “the fusion of these horizons” (Gadamer, 1975, p.273).

For Christianity, what, or who is the other? This question is quite

complicated. On one hand, to understand Levinas' the other would ultimately be to betray Levinas' understanding of it. Further, the understanding of the other, is quite a difficult task, and for Christianity even more difficult. Who speaks on the behalf of Christianity? I agree with Peperzak when he says, "Who could boast of having a total knowledge of Levinasian thought at one's disposal, or venture to say that one can grasp the entirety of Christian thinking "in one's own words" and thoughts?" (Peperzak, 2000, p.184). Therefore, what I want to do is to try to find the place of Levinas' the other in the teaching of Christianity. For this study I have no aim to construct any system of thought, or try to found theological basis from two different traditions. I just try to find the possibility of reading Levinas' the other in the Christian context.

II

What does Levinas mean by the "Other"? Levinas uses the term the "Other" (*autre*) to refer to alterity, or otherness in general, and the "other" (*autrui*) to refer to the personal other, or the other person. Levinas puts ethics as first philosophy prior to ontology, and his ethics begins at the encounter with the other in society. In the encounter with the other, Levinas' philosophy of ethics gives priority to the other. The primacy of ethics over ontology, according to Levinas, is the ethical relation with the other, in which this relation shows itself as the movement from the "I" toward the other, never to return to the "I." So true for Western philosophy, it has to move from the same to the other and never return to the same. The example he likes to use is the contrast between the story of Ulysses who always returns to Ithaca, and the story of Abraham, who wanders from his fatherland and never returns to his homeland.

Western philosophy, like the myth of Ulysses, is always nostalgic, always returns to the place where it leaves. Levinas says: "A work conceived radically movement of the same unto the other which never returns to the same. To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring back his son to the point of departure" (TTO, 348). The movement from the same to the

other and never return to the same, for Levinas, is the radical, and at the same time, irreversible movement. Levinas is perhaps pushing Western tradition towards the Jewish tradition, so that the Greek and the Jewish traditions could be bridged.

Levinas sees that Western philosophy from Parmenides to Heidegger has no place for otherness, and on the contrary strives to overcome otherness of the other by transmuting it into the same. Levinas, in *Totality and Infinity*, writes: “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (TI, 43). Levinas believes that Western philosophy is, in the end, often a projection of totality (especially apparent in Heidegger’s ‘Being’ or Hegel’s ‘Absolute Spirit’). This philosophy has the tendency to absorb the otherness of the other into the structure of the system. For Levinas, this project will begin at “thematization and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not at peace with the other but in suppression or possession of the other, for possession affirms the other, but within a negation of its independence. “I think” comes down to “I can” – to an appropriation of what is, to an exploitation of reality. Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (TI, 46). Levinas puts Western philosophy into question, and his critical view of Heidegger’s ontology and Hegelian totality as the philosophy of power is his main point of departure.

Levinas seems to see Western philosophy exemplified by Hegelian totality, and he wants to break up this totality and give a place for the otherness of the other. He confessed that his critique of totality came after a political experience that we have not yet forgotten (EI, 78-79). His experience of the Holocaust is his basic motivation for the move from totality to otherness. Whereas Western philosophy reduces all difference to the same, Levinas’ philosophy of ethics poses the question of totality and the concept of being open to otherness of the other without returning to the same. He says, “The Other as Other has nothing in common with the Same; it is not thinkable in a synthesis; there is an impossibility here of making comparisons and synchronizations. . . . And the ethical relationship no longer has to be subordinated to ontology or to the thinking of being” (GT, 127). For Levinas, the idea of the other is not the enemy of the same and its alterity does not bring us to the play of dialectic (LR, 209). The

dialectic is avoided so that the other will not be absorbed again into totality in which Levinas attempts to depart. The otherness of the other, for Levinas, is beyond any synthesis, any comparison, and any thematizability.

What is the otherness of Christianity? If Christianity places other religions as the other, how is Christianity oriented towards other religions? Is it possible to apply Levinas' criticism to Western philosophy to Christian theology? Then the question of the meaning and significance of other religions should concern the Christian theologian. In the world religions, Christianity has to accept truly and sincerely that Christianity is only one of other religions, and the plurality of religions is no mistake. The history of Christian Church in the period under the domination of mono-political theology allowed no place for other faiths resulting in violence and war. The presence of other religions seemed to be considered as a sign of the lack of efficiency of evangelization. Further, the sense of superiority implicit in colonialism tended to denigrate the diversity of cultures and religions. Then the mistrust of plurality and the oppression of the other become the source of conflict among people in both the same culture and between cultures. Christianity, then, should have to begin again, with openness to the presence of the other religions. The difference among religions should not be a cause for concern, but on the contrary, it should be an opportunity for mutual enrichment. A fruitful dialogue among religions has to begin with the acceptance of the presence of the other.

III

Levinas' philosophy of ethics begins with the priority of human relation in society, namely, the priority of the other person over the 'I.' The other, according to Levinas, is the other human being (IB, 171). If Western philosophy moves from the same to the other and never returns to the same, the ethical relation, for Levinas, also has to move from the 'I' to the other person without returning to the 'I.' For Levinas, the relationship between me and the other is asymmetrical, like the irreversibility of time (IB, 118). The 'I' is not the last word, and the 'I' or the self, for Levinas, seems to be the most problematic of Western philosophy. He says, "The I is the very crisis of the being of a being (*l'être de l'étant*) in the human. . .

I already ask myself whether my being is justified, whether the *Da* of my *Dasein* is not already the usurpation of someone's place" (AT, 28). Concerning the 'I', Levinas echoes what Pascal said long time ago in *Pensées*, "The self is hateful" (Pascal, 1995, 494). Pascal's the hateful 'I' directs Levinas to depart from the self and places the other prior to the self.

Modern Western philosophy begins with Descartes' *Cogito* – a foundation which has no place for the other. But for Levinas, "In positing the relation with the Other as ethical, one surmounts a difficulty that would be inevitable if, contrary to Descartes, philosophy started from a *cogito* that would posit itself absolutely independent of the Other" (TI, 210). For Descartes, knowledge begins with the thinking subject, and the self becomes the source of his epistemological foundation. The other becomes the object for self-reflection, and so the other is not absolutely the other. For Levinas, the absolutely other is not reflected in consciousness. It resists it to the point that even its resistance is not converted into a content of consciousness (TTO, 352-353). To give priority to the other is to put the self into question as he says, "The proximity of the other, origin of all putting into question of self" (AT, 99). When the self is put into question, according to Levinas, is precisely the welcome of the absolutely other (TTO, 353).

The other is recognized while the self is put into question, such is the beginning of Levinas' philosophy of ethics. The other is beyond any comprehension, or any thematizability, or in other words, the other is beyond ontological questioning. The other is neither initially nor ultimately what we grasp or what we thematize (TI, 172). For Levinas, if we could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power (TO, 90). The other, for Levinas, is not a part of any program of knowledge and power. We could not reduce the other to be the same, and we could not possess the other because the other is beyond our grasp. Levinas says, "The relationship with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility" (TO, 76).

Levinas' philosophy moves radically beyond ontological relation, and his irreducibility of the other becomes the total departure from the self without any return. For Levinas, "the departure from the self is the approach to the neighbour" (LR, 246). This approach to the other is to serve the neighbour. "To be in oneself is to express oneself, that is, al-

ready to serve the Other. The ground of expression is goodness” (TI, 183). To serve the other is an ethical demand from the other to the self without any return to the self. It is a kind of going outside the self without expecting something in return.

For Levinas, an ethical relation with the other is beyond knowledge and ontology. The other cannot be put into any category, and if the other is put into any category, the other is not the other. Levinas, in his book *Time and the Other*, talks about the other that is beyond graspable, or thematizable, like time. He sees time as beyond any conceptualizing, and prior to any understanding. We experience time but do not possess time, and we have no power over time. We experience the other but we could not possess the other and have no power over the other.

Levinas anticipates time and the other as a mystery (TO, 75). His positing of time and the other as mystery leads him to give us an account of the relationship with the other as the relationship with the future. The future seems to be completely unknowable, and beyond our grasp. The future is always beyond any expectation, and it is still the mystery of mankind. The future that we can talk of is only a presencing of the future, not the real future. Levinas says, “The future is what is in no way grasped. . . . The other is the future. The very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future” (TO, 76-77). Levinas does not want to define the other by the future, but the future by the other (TO, 82). When Levinas connects the other with time, he seems to accept the limit of human knowledge to take account of these two concepts. Actually, Levinas does not mean the other and time in form of concepts, but something prior to our conceptualization. He prefers to use the term ‘alterity’ of the other.

For Levinas, the alterity of the other must be respected at the moment of the encounter between human beings. Otherwise we are tempted to appropriate the other into the same, reducing it to an object. The other will not be absolutely other if the alterity of the other is not recognized. Levinas says, “I think that the true humanity of man begins in this recognition, before any cognition of being, before onto-logy. That is why I said to you that the question of the other seemed to me to be anterior to the problem of ontology” (IB, 106). For Levinas, the irreducibility of the alterity of the other is the moment where the ethical relationship between human beings begins. This is not ontology for the sake of understanding,

or knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but it is ethics, or goodness in which the alterity of the other is fully respected. Any program of reduction of the other to the same, or the return to the self, has to be put into question.

For Christianity, who is the other? The other person, or the ‘neighbor’ seems to be the point where Levinas and Christianity intersect, more specifically: inseparability between the love of God and the love of neighbor. Levinas’ ethics obliges us to approach our neighbor with love without concupiscence, and this asymmetrical relation has to move from the self to the other without returning to the self. For Christianity, Jesus Christ is the clear witness of this sacrificial love for the other person. Then to give priority to the other without trying to concern much of self-salvation is the way that Christians can build up their relationship to God through their neighbors. Our love of God is made practical through our love of our neighbor. Christians could not say that he loves God by being indifferent to the other. “Anyone who says, ‘I love God’, and hates his brother, is a liar, since a man who does not love the brother that he can see cannot love God, whom he has never seen” (1 Jn 4: 20).

Levinas’ philosophy of ethics in general seems to be the articulation of this love of the neighbor. This seems to be the most direct form of ethical relation which begins at the encounter with the face of the other. The face of the other is not an obstacle but an obligation. This obligation commands me not to let the other die in solitude as he says: “no face can be approached with empty hands and closed home” (TI, 172). Therefore the love of neighbor is not just the principle but it is the deed. You should ‘love your neighbor’ is not the same as ‘love your neighbor’. And this love of neighbor has to begin with their material needs such as welcoming a stranger, clothing those who are naked, giving a drink to those who are thirsty, feeding those who are hungry, etc. Dostoyevsky, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, says: “Strive to love your neighbor actively and constantly. In so far as you advance in love you will grow surer of the reality of God and of the immortality of your soul. If you attain perfect self-forgetfulness in the love of your neighbor, then you will believe without doubt. Doubt will no longer be able to enter your soul” (Dostoyevsky, 1999, p.64).

If Levinas and Christianity mutually agree with each other about how to do before the other, then it is not difficult to see how Levinas’ philoso-

phy of ethics can play even in the teaching of Christianity. He speaks little about 'love' but he prefers to use the word 'responsible' because the word 'love' can quite easily lead us to return to the self. We have to be responsible for the other and our responsible is not limited by any condition. If Christianity holds Jesus Christ as the model of their life, then to carry the cross and follow Jesus Christ means to be responsible for all men's sins. Salvation is not supposed to be a private affair. I think that Levinas follows the teaching of the elder, Father Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov*, who says, "There is only one means of salvation. Make yourself responsible for all men's sins. As soon as you sincerely make yourself responsible for everything and for all men, you will see at once that you have found salvation" (Dostoyevsky, 1999, p.310). Levinas stresses this form of responsibility which is not demanded from the other but from our self.

Christianity and Levinas speak in the same language concerning the identity of the other. It is our neighbor, the stranger, the poor, the widow, and the orphan, etc. This is the answer of Jesus Christ when tested by the lawyer, who asks the question: Who is the neighbor? (Lk 10: 29-37) The story of the Good Samaritan opens the line that draws the distinction between the Jews and the Samaritan. Even though Jesus was expelled from Samaria a couple weeks before this story, and even James and John asked Jesus to bring fire from heaven to burn this town, Jesus makes this good example to redefine the meaning of neighbor beyond any line of race, ethnicity and country. Neighbor is not just someone who lives around our house, is not just someone we are familiar with, but she/he is the one who stands in front of us. We have to be ready for the presence of the other. The teaching in the Gospel in many parts such as the story of the wise and the foolish bridesmaids (Mt 25: 1-13), or in the Gethsemane when Jesus urges his disciple to stay awake with him (Mt 26: 36-46), points out the significance of always being wakeful. Levinas takes into account of being vigilant or to be wakeful, not for the second coming of Jesus Christ but the coming of the other. Then in the next part I will try to study the possibility of the relation between Levinas' vigilant ethics and Christianity's wakefulness.

IV

Levinas' philosophy of ethics begins at the encounter with the other person, and this encounter puts the self into question. The calling into question of self-existing is the ethical, and he begins his philosophy of ethics with the response "Here I am." This is the response to God from Abraham (Gn 22:2), from Samuel (1 S 3:4), from Isaiah (Is 6:9), and others. Levinas seems to use this as the paradigm for his ethical response to the other person as well. According to him, I have to respond "Here I am" to the other and in this response it puts myself into question and opens myself totally for the other. The disclosure of the self is to be ready for the call of the other, and the response "Here I am" is an ethical response of responsibility. I could not allow myself to sleep because I have to be ready for the call. Samuel was awakened by the three calls of Yahweh, and his answer "Speak, Yahweh, your servant is listening" (1 S 3:9) is supposed to be my response to the other as well. The call actually dismisses the self and brings the other into my place. The call always interrupts my self-existing. The call of my own being is challenged by the call of the other. The call of the other always asks for a sacrifice to the other. This is the call to holiness as Levinas says, "The call to holiness preceding the concern for existing, for being-there and being-in-the-world" (EN, 216). At the moment I hear the call, I have to respond, and Levinas asks me to respond responsibly. Actually I can exercise my freedom to say 'yes' or 'no' to that call, but for Levinas, that call implements an ethical demand that I cannot leave the other alone and enjoys my own solitary existence. But I have to respond: "Here I am," and this response is an obligation, not a choice. Cohen says,

This moral insomnia reminds us of an other of Levinas's formulae for the psyche, the biblical expression, "here I am" (Hebrew: *hineni*), referring to an availability, a vulnerability, a responsiveness to the call of the other. God calls Abraham, and Abraham responds: "Here I am." Abraham calls Isaac, and Isaac responds: "Here I am." "Here I am" – already a sacrifice. Insomniac, the self is wakened by the other and for the other, by its obligations to and for the other. (Cohen, 2001, p.204)

“Here I am” is passively receiving the command from God, and for Levinas, it is also the paradigmatic response to the other. Levinas uses the prophet’s response to God as the template for our ethical relationship to the other person. For Levinas, the other is not God, but through the epiphany of the other’s face I hear the word of God. He quotes Matthew 25 (IB, 52), concerning the Last Judgment, in which we will be judged according to what we do to our neighbor, not to God directly – acts such as giving a drink to those who are thirsty, feeding those who are hungry, welcoming a stranger, clothing those who are naked, visiting those who are sick, or are in prison. God will say to those who act accordingly to neighbors: “I tell you solemnly, in so far as you did this to one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did it to me” (Mt 25:40), and on the contrary God will say to those who deny their neighbors: “I tell you solemnly, in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to me” (Mt 25:45). As to the question about the relation between God and the other, Levinas says:

I cannot describe the relation to God without speaking of my concern for the other. When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25: the relation to God is presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor; in the other, there is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the word of God. It is not a metaphor. It is not only extremely important; it is literally true. I’m not saying that the other is God, but that in his or her face I hear the word of God. (IB, 171)

When Levinas mentions the teachings in the Gospel, Matthew 25, he is reminding us that the way we treat the other is the way we treat God. The infinite is revealed through the other. He often refers to the Jewish proverb: “the other’s material needs are my spiritual needs.” Ethical relation, for Levinas, begins at the response to the other’s material needs. To feed the hungry, clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give shelter to the shelterless, are my responsibility. Holiness begins with ‘practical’ morality. And he stresses that practical morality is essentially based on an ethical relation which cannot be separated from human relationships. He says, “I have been speaking about that which stands behind practical morality; about the extraordinary relation between a man and his neighbour,

a relation that continues to exist even when it is severely damaged” (LR, 247).

Through our ethical relation to the other, we are truly in relation to God. For Levinas, “The trace of the infinite is inscribed in my obligation toward the other, in this moment that corresponds to the call” (AT, 106). The call of the other and our response is the beginning of our spiritual growth, and we could not approach the other with empty hands. He writes: “That the glory of the Infinite is glorified only by the signification of the-one-for-the-other, as sincerity, that in my sincerity the Infinite passes the finite, that the Infinite comes to pass there, is what makes the plot of ethics primary, and what make language irreducible to an act among acts” (OB, 150). Then the glory of the Infinite will be glorified by our response “Here I am” to strangers, widows, orphans, neighbors. Through the epiphany of the face of the other, God leaves a trace, and for Levinas “to know God is to do justice to the neighbour” (GT, 199).

At the moment I hear the call, Levinas’ philosophy of ethics plays the central role in my conscience, and it reminds me of the primacy of the other over me. The call of the other replaces the call of my own being, the other’s call ruptures any coherent idea of systematic ethics. The call to sacrifice myself for the other is always prior to an exercise of my freedom. I am not free before the call of the other, and I have to respond responsibly “Here I am” for the other. Levinas’ ethical is always attached to the other person, and without even prior knowledge of the other, if I hear the call, I have to answer. If I close myself to his or her call, I will be judged in the manner of Matthew 25 where my service to the other is always prior to any other ethical principle.

Levinas’ philosophy of ethics teaches me not to separate ethical commandment from the openness to this call of the other. I could not live securely in a closed-home but I have to open the door to welcome my unknown guest, as Abraham welcomed the three men warmly and respectfully by saying, “My lord, I beg you, if I find favour with you, kindly do not pass our servant by. A little water shall be brought; you shall wash your feet and lie down under the tree. Let me fetch a little bread and you shall refresh yourselves before going further. That is why you have come in your servant’s direction” (Gn 18:3-5). For Caputo, this is the law of the land of the Semitic world, or the law of God, and he questions whether it

is the same law. To welcome the stranger like Abraham welcomes the three men is to welcome God. Caputo says,

In the Semitic world of desert wanderers, nothing is more important than hospitality. Hospitality is the fundamental condition of survival, an unconditional necessity of life. The duty owed the wanderer and the stranger is holy and inviolable, and without it the world of wanderers would perish by its own hand. To provide a place of respite and refuge, to offer bread and water, even to take food out of one's own mouth in order to share it with the stranger, in short, to make welcome, that is the law of the land, indeed, that is the law of God (Are these the same law? Is it the one law because it is the other?). The traveler who appears at our door is marked by God, who has signed the face of the stranger and placed him or her under divine protection. The one who receives the stranger receives God and bears the mark of "the God who loves the stranger." (Caputo, 2000, p.276)

This clarifies the relation between the dramatic event of Abraham and Levinas' philosophy of ethics, which Levinas does not limit to the law of the land of the Semitic world, but attempts to translate into an ethics of humanity. Levinas' philosophy of ethics obliges me to be open to the call of the other, and my ethical response must begin with the saying "Here I am." I have to be always wakeful and vigilant to the call of the other and I have to respond responsibly to the call which always comes to me before my choice. I am chosen to receive the call, and for me this seems to be the divine call, which is the call of stranger I have to welcome, or the call of prisoner I have to visit, or the call of those who are hungry I have to feed, or the call of those who are naked I have to clothe.

V

Reading Levinas' philosophy of ethics leads us to deal with his religious point of view. He accepts that his highest aim in philosophy of ethics is holiness, and this ideal of holiness seems to be the ultimate aim of humanity. I am not surprised to see that the other, for Levinas, is the stranger, the widow, and the orphan (TI, 215); (AT, 97). These are the people

behind Levinas' other, and when he mentions a Jewish proverb: 'the other's material needs are my spiritual needs,' he means it is necessary to begin ethics not with theoretical ontology, but with sensible morality. He does not aim at the rational principle as in Kantian ethics, but for him, ethics arises in relation to the other and not straightaway by a reference to the universality of a law (IB, 114). Ethics, for Levinas is all about goodness, mercy, and charity. And this ethics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished through service and hospitality (TI, 300). He adds, "I am for the other in a relationship of deaconship: I am in service to the other" (GT, 161). If these sentences reflect Levinas' philosophy of ethics, we could say his philosophy of ethics begins with service to the other: the stranger, the widow, and the orphan. Levinas echoes the words from the Mount of Sinai when he says: The alterity of the other is the extreme point of the "Thou shalt not kill" (EN, 169). This commandment does not mean only not to kill the other, but also to defend the life of the other. For Levinas, it is not just a matter of mortality of the other that we have to defend but also the living of the other that we are called for. The other, therefore, is always my concern.

For my part, I do not think that Christianity can reject the significance of this call. Jesus Christ, in his summary of the whole law, says, *You must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind.* This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second resembles it: *You must love your neighbour as yourself.* On these two commandments hangs the whole Law, and the Prophets also." (Mt 22: 37-40). This is not just an ethical principle, but it is a commandment. Both the two commandments go together. We could not accept the first without the second, which means "anyone who loves God must also love his brother" (1Jn 4: 21). This is not a guiding principle or a theoretical statement that you 'ought' to love your neighbour, but it is the commandment: you 'must' love your neighbor. The other is your neighbour to whom you have to be wakeful to receive his or her call. Levinas often says, "You cannot let the other die in solitude," and you have to help the other even "take the food from our own mouth." The calling of our neighbor whether Jewish or Christian is a divine call, and we cannot 'not' respond. The needs of our neighbor are always our responsibility. Christianity and Levinas concur with each other concerning the significance of

the calling of the other. We are chosen to receive the calling of the other, and the Biblical tradition reminds us to receive the call with the holy word: “Here I am.”

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ENDNOTE

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are in use throughout this article referring to works by Levinas.

- AT *Alterity and Transcendence*. Michael B. Smith. (Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- EI *Ethics and Infinity*. Richard A. Cohen. (Trans.). Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1985.
- EN *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*. Michael B. Smith & Barbara Harshav. (Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- GT *God, Death, and Time*. Bettina Bergo. (Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- IB *Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*. Jill Robbins (Ed.). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- LR *The Levinas Reader*. Seán Hand (Ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. OB *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*. Alphonso Lingis.

- (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
- TI *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Alphonso Lingis. (Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
- TO *Time and the Other*. Richard A. Cohen. (Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.
- TTO *The Trace of the Other*. In Mark C. Taylor (Ed.). *Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy*. Alphonso Lingis. (Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 345-359.

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