
SĀṆKHYA TEACHINGS FOUND IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM: AN INQUIRY INTO AN ANALOGY DEPICTED IN THE *VISUDDHIMAGGA*

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ABSTRACT

In the study of philosophies in religions, occasionally, parallel concepts among the religions are also found. For that reason, to understand the original form and precise doctrine of the religions, it is essential to study their history too. The analogy “blind and lame” found in the *Visuddhimagga* was applied by Buddhaghosa to explain the teaching of Dependent Origination. The same analogy was utilized by Ísvara Kṛṣṇa to explain the interrelationship between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* in *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In consequence, a doubt arises whether the Theravada Buddhist texts were shaded by non-Buddhist systems accepted soul theory. Also, this doubt leads to misunderstand that the teachings of the Dependent and Origination and *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are identical. Nevertheless, examining the historical records related to these two different religious texts and their traditions, it is obvious that they were different teachings in different contexts. So, this article aims to corroborate the variations of them with reference to the history of religions: Buddhism and *Sāṅkhya*.

Introduction

The grand commentary of Pali literature, the *Visuddhimagga*, was compiled by Buddhaghosa in Ceylon in the 5th century AD. Basing itself on the *Tipiṭaka*, it attempts to systemize the essential teachings of the Theravada tradition. Buddhaghosa had to deduce certain sources, which were not admitted by *Mahāvihāra* monks.¹ It indicates that his writing was thoroughly supervised and evaluated by *Mahāvihāra* monks. Nevertheless, it is apparent that some illustrations which come to light in the *Vism* are similar to those found in Buddhist Sanskrit texts.² It is presumable that the *Vism* might be influenced by the *Sāṅkhya* system too. For instance, the following analogy found in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*³ is also found in the *Vism*:

“*Tattha jaccandhopi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena sakena balena gacchati, pīṭhasappīpi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena sakenabalena gacchati, na ca tesam aññamaññaṃ nissāya gamanaṃ nappavattati, evamevaṃ nāmampi nittejaṃ na sakena tejena uppajjati,*”⁴[Here, the blind man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy and power, the lame man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy and power, in the absence of their mutual co-operation walking does not come to be, thus, Name is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with its own efficacy and power, Form is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with its own efficacy and power].

Apart from the above analogy, three commentaries, (the *Vism*, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā* and the *Sammohavinodanī*) clearly criticize the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya* by corroborating that ‘*Avijjā*’ is not the primordial entity of the world.⁵ Besides, defining ‘emptiness’, the *Vism*, repeatedly rejects *Sāṅkhya* teaching linked to Dependent Origination.⁶

Yet, Buddhaghosa takes in the analogy ‘blind and lame’ incorporated even in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* in his great Pali work, without any ambivalence. In this article, I will attempt to break through the background of how the *Sāṅkhya* teachings⁷ influenced the *Vism* with special reference to the analogy of ‘blind and lame.’

Early Buddhist Aspect of the Analogy

The ‘epistemology’ involved is the way of gaining knowledge in regard to the world and being. The variability of the ‘theory of knowledge’ appears in relation to the forms of the final emancipation. Thus, Buddhism admits perception (including extraordinary perception)⁸ and inference⁹ to be the epistemological means of gaining knowledge. It is to say that some disagreements among present scholars are set up with regard to the inferences discussed in Buddhist literature.¹⁰ In the *Nikāya* texts, the term ‘*anumāna*’ and ‘*anvayañāṇa*’ are employed in the sense of inference.¹¹ Buddhist inference appeared as a correlated concept in terms of Dependent Origination. In this regard, Jayatilake suggests that the Buddhist inference is based on the ordinary and extraordinary perceptions.¹² Hence, it is clear that this suggestion generalizes the prevalence of inference in early Buddhist teaching. Accordingly, the analogy can be defined as the technical part of the inference.¹³ In consequence, obviously Buddhism also applied analogies in the way of epistemology.

The Analogy ‘Blind and Lame’ in the *Visuddhimagga*

Illustrating the interdependence of Name and Form, Buddhaghosa adopts the analogy of ‘blind and lame’ in the *Diṭṭhivissuddhi-niddesa* of the *Vism*. This analogy leads to the view that the Name does not exist without Form and vice versa.¹⁴ Though the aim of using this analogy was to explain Buddhist doctrine, herein, Buddhaghosa had borrowed it from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Regarding this identical feature in both *Vism* and *Sāṅkhya*, I intend to draw four different postulates as follows.

1. Buddhaghosa was influenced by *Sāṅkhya* system directly.
2. *Sāṅkhya* was influenced by Buddhism.
3. This was not a mistake done by Buddhaghosa. He simply followed the elders' sources only.
4. The likeness of the analogy used in the *Vism* and the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is demonstrable in the sense of epistemology only, not in context.

Relationship between Buddhaghosa and *Sāṅkhya* system

The strong Brahmanical background of Buddhaghosa inherited by birth signifies a possibility of *Sāṅkhya* philosophy influencing his works. Particularly, as the *Mahāvamsa* and the *Buddhaghosuppatti* have recorded, Buddhaghosa studied Brahmanic teachings and developed mastery in three Veda-s in his teen years.¹⁵ Moreover, the history of the birth of Buddhaghosa (*Buddhaghosuppatti*) explicitly gives an account that Buddhaghosa was from a Brahmin family¹⁶ that both Kesi and his son Ghosa were well-versed in three Veda-s. On the other hand, Buddhaghosa, before his leaving for Ceylon, made an effort to convert his father to be a Buddhist and succeeded.¹⁷ The effort he made to convert his father also indicates how strong his father as a Brahmin was. However, Kosambi Dhammānanda traces a divergent suggestion to the facts found in the *Mahāvamsa* and the *Buddhaghosuppatti*. He emphasizes that Buddhaghosa was not a Brahmin.¹⁸ The attestation brought to prove his suggestion was that Buddhaghosa demonstrated unawareness in explaining the doctrine and culture of Brahmanism in India.¹⁹ Prof. Abeynayake logically overrules the opinion given by Kosambi Dammānanda and corroborates that Buddhaghosa did not think to practise further as a Brahmin since he had been trained in the Buddhist Order.²⁰

Venerable Revata, the teacher of Buddhaghosa, was a great Theravada monk and there is no dependable clue to conclude that Buddhaghosa inserted Brahmanical teachings in his works completed while he was in

India. On the other hand, it can be inferred that venerable Revata, after recognizing the non-Buddhist influence in Buddhaghosa's works, advised to arrive in Ceylon and translate the Commentaries existed in Sinhalese as an assessment to rectify his understanding in another way. But, there are insufficient facts to support corroborating the above inference.

Likely Buddhist Influence on *Sāṅkhya*

The second attempt is to inquire whether this analogy appeared as an outcome of Buddhist influence towards the *Sāṅkhya* system. The *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* contains a few analogies which are parallel to Pali Post Canonical and Commentarial literature. Even so, the analogy 'lame and blind' in the *Vism* cannot be found in the Pali Canonical or Post Canonical literature and in consequence, this analogy can be counted as a teaching borrowed from *Sāṅkhya*. Accordingly, the *Nettipakarāṇa* incorporates the analogy milk and curd,²¹ which is more familiar with *Sāṅkhya* teachings.²² Nevertheless, the *Nettipakarāṇa* falls under the category of the Post Canonical literature and is dated to the 1st century BCE.²³ In a further inquiry on the *Nettipakarāṇa*, Norman suggests that it was compiled in North-India.²⁴ As he says, the *Arya* meter which was familiar to Vedic texts have been employed in the *Nettipakarāṇa* and this text often was used by Buddhaghosain his works. If his assumption is accurate, inevitably, the author of the *Nettipakarāṇa* also was inclined to Brahmanic teachings like *Sāṅkhya*.

Besides, the historical facts revealed in the Pali literature connected to the *Sāṅkhya* also support this postulate. Unanimously, scholars accept that the founder of *Sāṅkhya* was the seer Kapila. Kapila is recognized as an independent seer and also a representative of the Godhead. No doubt, this difference damages the claim that Kapila obtained a great reputation as an outstanding philosopher. In any case, the correlation between *Sāṅkhya* and *Upaniṣad* is irrefutable because the two *Upaniṣad* texts give accounts of the seer Kapila, especially in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.²⁵ Moreover, the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Mahabharata* refer to the term *Sāṅkhya*.²⁶ As

Muller finds, the classical *Upaniṣad* refer only to two names of Indian philosophical systems; *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*.²⁷ These factors signify that Kapila the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy has to be stratified into early strata of the *Upaniṣad* (before the composition of the *Bhagavad-Gīta*, the *Mahabharata* and the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.) Yet, it should be noted here that the name Kapila is not unique to *Sāṅkhya* or Hindu philosophy. The *Uttarajjhaya*, one of four Mūla texts of the Jain Canon, also gives details with reference to Kapila, who attained Pacceka-Buddha hood.²⁸ And, the Buddhist literature also holds a sizeable account of seer Kapila. Particularly, the Buddhist history records about two Kapilas. Therein, Kapila encountered in the *Sutta-nipāta* was an evil person.²⁹ But, referring to the commentaries, the next Kapila could be recognized as a great seer, who practised hard practices and later on sacrificed his own monastery and the region to build the city *Kapilavatthu*.³⁰ The *Saundarānanda* also affirms that Kapila was a great seer and he dedicated his territory to build *Kapilavasthu*.³¹ If the commentary of the *Sutta-nipāta* is acceptable the Kapila found in this commentary could be the same person, who set up the *Sāṅkhya* system. Also, it would be the most historical evidence in terms of seer Kapila or the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy in both Pali and Sanskrit literature and as such *Sāṅkhya* could be considered as more antique than Buddhism. The critical note on *Sāṅkhya* teachings found in the *Pañcappakaraṇa-anu-ṭīkā* would be vital source leading to clear evidence regarding this discussion. In this sub-commentary, venerable Ānanda also pointed out that Kapila was a seer who founded the *Sāṅkhya* teachings.³² As modern scholars claim, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* written by Ishvara Kṛṣṇa would be better considered as the most historical text in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.³³ Accordingly, I presume by referring to the attestations of the *Mahabharata*, the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* that the *Sāṅkhya* teaching was found by Kapila between 7th century and the 5th century BCE.

The statement, “*pakati kho esā, kassapa, lokasmiṃ ‘dukkaraṃ sāmāññaṃ dukkaraṃ brahmañña’*”,³⁴ found in the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* is another controversial reference to consider seriously. Maurice Walshe

translates the term ‘*pakati*’ (*prakṛti?*); “so they say in the world.”³⁵ It is observed that he evades this term ‘*pakati*’ without giving a direct translation. The commentary of the *Dīgha-nikāya* defines the term ‘*pakati*’ as a kind of teaching.³⁶ Moreover, the *Dīgha-nikāya-ṭīkā* illustrates the term ‘*pakati*’ (*prakṛti?*) to be “*lokasiddhavāda*.”³⁷ As Pali sub-commentarial literature explains, “*loka-siddhavāda*” can be defined in three contexts. Firstly, it seems to be a way of functions related to nature.³⁸ The other meaning is connected to the teaching of epistemology. Particularly, defining the term “*yathā nāmā*,” the *Majjhima-nikāya-ṭīkā*, notes “to demonstrate that this is the reality, comprehending after analyzed the objects what not analyzed is called *yathā nāmā*.”³⁹ The third context is the practice followed by non-Buddhist ascetics.⁴⁰ So, herein the last two contexts are identical in both theoretically and pragmatically. The teaching of *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* is familiar with the third explanation. In this respect, I understand the term “*loka-siddhavāda*” in the sub-commentarial literature leads to a religious teaching. Probably, that could be *Sāṅkhya*. Apparently, it can be assumed that the term “*loka-siddhavāda*” depicted in the sub-commentaries in the context of epistemology means “the teachings of origin or form of the world.” As Yoga teachings believe, “*loka siddha*” is a practitioner, who attained all yogic accomplishment.⁴¹ Therefore, it is possible to accept that “*loka-siddhavada*” signifies the teaching of *Sāṅkhya* because *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are inseparable. After considering all the facts, it has to be accepted that by explaining “*pakati*” the *ṭīkā* literature refer to *Sāṅkhya*. Thus, if the interpretations come to light in the *ṭīkā*-s are acceptable, beyond a doubt, it should be admitted that even in Buddha’s time, the *Sāṅkhya*, which accepts primordial entities, was existent. Accordingly, a hypothesis can be traced whether the antiquity of *Sāṅkhya* was the cause to insert this analogy into the *Vism*. But, the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* contains the term “*pakati*” in the sense of nature, common or universal characteristic only. The illustrations of commentators are insufficient to say that the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* indicates any clue regarding this discussion. And, it should be remembered that though we accept that the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* refers to *Sāṅkhya* system, the *sutta* itself demonstrates that the Buddha kept it away (*pakati*) pointing out its futility.

Further accounts that the *Sāṅkhya* system existed in Buddha's time are implied in the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*. The first evidence on this subject is found in the introductory note given by Bhikkhu Thanissara in his translation of the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*.⁴² As he has discussed, the history of *Sāṅkhya* system extends back to the time of Uddaka and it developed up to the classical stage at the time of the Buddha. Bhikkhu Thanissara claims that the listeners of this sutta were mastered in *Sāṅkhya*. Consequently, because the Buddha's explanation was not equal to the views they already held, they were displeased with this discourse. In a further inquiry into its commentary, facts may be found which partly advocate the aforementioned suggestion. The listeners were Brahmanas, and this sutta was delivered in the form of arisen needs (*aṭṭhuppattika*).⁴³ Moreover, the sutta notes that the Buddha intended to elaborate "the root causes of all the dhamma-s" (*sabbadhamma mūlapariyāya*). Especially, this teaching leads to substantiate non-self [(he does) not conceive Nibbāna, in Nibbāna, from Nibbāna or Nibbāna as mine].⁴⁴ It indicates the listeners held a conceit on the ultimate truth and Buddha wanted to get rid of their conceit completely. Notably, *Sāṅkhya* also admitted theory of evolution except *mūla prakṛti*. In other words, *Sāṅkhya* does not accept non-self in relation to the ultimate truth (*puruṣa*).⁴⁵ So, did the Buddha try to make these Brahmanas understand, who held views that the ultimate truth is eternal, by delivering this sutta that there is no self even in Nibbāna? However the followers were not pleased with the explanation given by the Buddha. This postulate tends to agree with the suggestion made by Bhikkhu Thanissara. Nevertheless, the information provided in the commentary is that these followers were full of conceit in terms of their knowledge of Buddhism and the Buddha delivered this sutta to demolish their conceit. The same accounts that the commentary has given are found in the *Mūlapariyāya Jātaka* too. Seemingly, the aim of delivering the sutta, as the commentary notes, runs counter to the Bhikkhu Thanissara's suggestion. In this respect, it is difficult to come to a precise conclusion regarding this assumption. As I understand, without an awareness of the geographical background of the history of *Sāṅkhya*, it is difficult

to affirm the above argument. In other words, if we have dependable facts that the city *Ukkatṭhā*, where the Buddha delivered this sutta was a territory for *Sāṅkhya* followers, it could be accepted that the listeners of this sutta were *Sāṅkhya* followers. Accordingly, the second hypothesis I posited should be overruled due to its lack of evidence.

Multiplicity of Sources

In line with the third point, I assume that the *Vism* was not merely an independent treatise and it was guided by the *Vimuttimagga* (*Vim*). But, popular opinion is that in compiling the *Vism*, Buddhaghosa applied the old Sinhalese commentaries accepted by Mahāvihārins only. Consequently, still, there is no explicit agreement among the Pali Buddhist scholars that Buddhaghosa followed the *Vim* in compiling the *Vism*. To this point, Bapat notes;

“And so, the only theory that seems to us as most probable, is the theory, no 1: That Buddhaghosa had Upatissa’s book, *Vimuttimagga*, before him and that he, taking the framework of the Upatissa’s *Vimuttimagga*, simplified it with his scholastic erudition and composed his work *Visuddhimagga*, which has certainly far outshone Upatissa’s *Vimuttimagga*.”⁴⁶

As he points out, the *Vism* was structured as the *Vim*. Malalasekara also remarks in this regard, “There is, I feel, no need to conclude, therefore, that “the *Visuddhimagga*, which has been considered to be entirely Buddhaghosa’s own work is in reality a revised version of Upatissa’s *Vimuttimagga*”.⁴⁷ In this respect, he also partly agrees to admit that the *Vim* influenced the *Vism*. In this discussion, Hinuber suggests that the *Vim* was earlier than *Vism* and later than the commentary of the *Paṭisambhidā*.⁴⁸ To the same point, Norman advocates that the *Vim* took the reins to the *Vism*.⁴⁹ Accordingly, it is clear that the *Vism* was structured

in the shade of the Vim. In fact, this analogy is found in the Vim. So, it is acceptable that the Vism was shaded by the Vim.⁵⁰ As modern scholars assume, the author of the Vim is encountered in the list of the lineage of the Theras.⁵¹ Also, he was living in North India, while he was composing the Vim.⁵² To the above evidence, he was an elder of Theravada lineage and the text was composed in India. Thus, it is possible to influence contemporary Sanskrit or Brahmanic literary features towards the Vim. As the outcome of following the Vim, the analogy 'blind and lame' may have been incorporated in the Vism. Accordingly, if we accept that compiling the commentaries, Buddhaghosa was interested in using trustworthy sources beyond elders' notes, it is not difficult to admit that this analogy also was borrowed by him from the Vim.

Contextual Diversity

The fourth postulate is that Buddhaghosa borrowed some analogies from *Sāṅkhya* to substantiate Buddhist teachings. In connection with it, he intended to use the analogy 'blind and lame' in the sense of epistemology because it was an ideal analogy to describe Dependent Origination. Especially, in accordance to *Sāṅkhya*, *Puruṣa* is defined to be the psychological part and *Prakṛti* is the physical part. *Prakṛti* cannot move ahead just as the cripple cannot walk alone. The *Puruṣa* does not function independently just as the blind man cannot see, but can walk. Further, it is equal to a charioteer without a chariot and a chariot without a charioteer. This simile was applied by Buddhaghosa to explain the interrelationship between Name and Form.⁵³ In applying the analogy which comes in *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* to the context deliberated in the Vism; the Name (*nāma*), similar to the concept *Puruṣa* in *Sāṅkhya* like a blind man. As *Sāṅkhya* interprets, the *Puruṣa* is the primordial principle. Yet, the Vism has not defined either Name or Form to be primordial. In the same passage, Buddhaghosa, having cited the *Nalakaḷāpa-sutta*, substantiates that both Name and Form are interrelated. In addition to that, the *Sāṅkhya* accepts that the causation is allowed for *Prakṛti* only. In this manner, if Buddhaghosa

imitated outright the *Sāṅkhya*, he would have symbolized that causation is rendered in matter only. But, Buddhaghosa's way of explaining was completely different in the context than the teachings of *Sāṅkhya*.

Conclusion

Sāṅkhya philosophy manifests a few similarities with Buddhism by accepting the concept of suffering. Besides, analyzing the analogy 'lame and blind' found in the *Vism*, it is difficult to say unanimously that Buddhaghosa absorbed the teachings of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. In this regard the first hypothesis I traced should be avoided. Undoubtedly, Buddhaghosa had mastery of Brahmanism. But the evidence is not adequate to prove that the life of the Buddhaghosa was influenced by *Sāṅkhya*. Also, it is impossible to corroborate that Buddhism influenced *Sāṅkhya*.

As I understand, this analogy in the *Vism* was the result of following the *Vim*, which was composed in North-India where the Brahmanic teachings critically spread. Upatissa, the author of the *Vim*, was an Indian monk, and entered to the Buddhist Order from a Brahmin family. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that he thrived with traditional Brahmanical knowledge and he utilized the analogy to explain Buddhist doctrine. Also, both Buddhaghosa and Upatissa were from Brahmin families and were familiar with this analogy. However, it is not difficult to accept that Upatissa borrowed this analogy from the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. This is because he had more freedom in compiling the commentaries than Buddhaghosa, who had to adhere to the rules introduced by *Mahāvihāra* monks. But, Hinuber suggests that the *Vim* also used the Theravada *Tipiṭaka*.⁵⁴ Finally, it should be noted that even though Buddhaghosa cited the analogy, explicitly it can be substantiated that Buddhaghosa used the analogy which is found in *Sāṅkhya* merely in a structural manner. He had no intention to absorb or follow the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya* in the context.

END NOTES

¹“He also mentions the Andhaka-aṭṭhakathā, although almost always to reject its views,” K. R. Norman, *Pali Literature*, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983) 121. Further he discusses and puts forward his opinion that this rejection was not merely due to the content of the texts, but due to the language that they used: Dravadians, *Ibid*, 122.

²The Kaṅkhāvitaraṇavisuddhi-niddesa of the Vism contains a series of stanzas referring to the elders (porāṇās). Some stanzas among them are similar with the stanzas of the Karma Karmaphala Paṛiṅṣā of the Mūlamadyamaka Kārikā. For instance:

“*Karma cen nāsti kartā ca kutaḥ syāt karmajaṃ phalaṃ,*

asaty atha phale bhoktā kuta eva bhaviṣyati.” David. J. Kalupahana, *Madyamaka*

Kārikā of Nāgarjuna. ed. and trans. (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1999) chap. 17-30.

“*Kammaṣa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako*

Suddhadhammā pavattanti, evetaṃ sammadassanaṃ, C. A. F. Rhys Davids,

Visuddhimagga, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1975) 602.

³*Puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ - kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya*

Paṅgvandhavadubhayorapi-saṃyogastatḥsargah, Swami Virupakshananda, *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. ed. and trans., (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1995) stnz. 21.

⁴Rhys Davids, 596. / N. R. M., Ehara, SomaThera & KhemindaThera, *The Path of Freedom (Vimuttimagga)*, (Colombo: D. Roland D Weerasuriya, 1961) 284.

⁵*kiṃ pakati viya avijjāpi akāraṇaṃ mūlakāraṇaṃ lokassāti? Na akāraṇaṃ.*

“*Āsavaṣamudayā avijjāsamudayo*”ti, Rhys Davids, 525. / A. P. Buddhadatta, *Vibhangaṃpakaraṇa aṭṭhakathā*. ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1980) 133. / C.V. Joshi, *Paṭisambhidāmagga aṭṭhakathā*. ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979) 198.

⁶*Nirodhasuññāni vā tīṇi, nirodho ca sesattayasūñño. Phalasuñño vā ettha hetu samudaye dukkhassābhāvato, magge ca nirodhassa, na phalena sagabbho pakati viya.*, Rhys Davids, 513.

⁷In an etymological inquiry of the term *Sāṅkhya*, Sanskrit English Dictionary discloses that it was based on numbers. *Sāṅkhya* means ‘reckoning up’ or ‘enumerating.’, Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, 4thed. (New Delhi: Motilal Banarshidass Publishers, 2005) 1199. Because this teaching is utterly systematized on 25 true entities (*tatvas*), it is known to be a philosophy entitled by numbers or numerical system. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy comes to exist parallel to Yoga. Typically, the *Sāṅkhya* is

considered to be the philosophical part of Yoga, Brian Carr, & Indira Mahalingam, *Asian philosophy*. ed. (London: Routledge, 1997) 139. Companion Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy highlights only one significant difference between these two philosophies; One important difference is that Yoga is theistic whereas *Sāṅkhya* is atheistic. Ibid.

⁸In addition to normal perception, there is cognition of paranormal or extrasensory perception, as a valid means of knowledge, K. N. Jayatilake, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*. (London: Goerge Allen and Limited, 1963) 437.

⁹Along with perception, both normal and paranormal, seems to have gone inference (*anumāna*). Ibid, 441.

¹⁰Jayatilake points out; “The word ‘*anumāna*’ occurs apparently in the sense of ‘inference’ despite Mrs Rhys Davids’ statement that ‘*anumāna* apparently does not occur at all’ in the Piṭaka-s (v. ERE., Vol. 8, p. 133, fn. 4)”. Ibid, 441- 442. Yet, further he explains referring the *Anumāna-sutta* too.

¹¹“*Tatrāvuso, bhikkhunā attanāva attānaṃ evaṃ anuminitabbaṃ – ‘yo khvāyaṃ puggalo pāpiccho, pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gato, ayaṃ me puggalo appiyo amanāpo; ahañceva kho panassaṃ pāpiccho pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gato, ahampāssaṃ pasesaṃ appiyo amanāpo’ ti. Evaṃ jānantenāvuso, bhikkhunā ‘na pāpiccho bhavissāmi, na pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gato’ ti cittaṃ uppādetabbaṃ.*”, R. V. Trenckner,, *Majjhima-nikāya*. ed.vol. I. (London: Pali Text Society, 1983) 97.

¹²These inferences are made on the data of perception, normal and paranormal. What is considered to constitute knowledge are direct inferences made on the basis of the data of such perceptions. Ibid, 443.

¹³The remotest connection, natural or magical, between two things is sufficient for the Brahmanas to draw the analogy that ‘*A* is like *B*’ on the basis of which inferences are made. ibid, 30. – Sometimes, Jain canonical texts signify that inference and analogy are in two different ways to obtain knowledge “The Sutras, however, regard *upamā* or comparison (analogy) as a means of knowledge different from inference. We have seen that the word *pramāṇa* was used in the sense of a ‘means of knowledge’ in the above quotation from the Uttaradhyayana Sutra” Ibid, 167.

¹⁴*Apicettha nāmaṃ nittejaṃ na sakena tejena pavattituṃ sakkoti..... nāmaṃ nissāya rūpaṃ pavattati, rūpaṃ nissāya nāmaṃ pavattati... Imassa panatthassa vibhāvanatthāya imaṃ upamaṃ mudāharanti – yathā ca pīthasappīca*, Rhys Davids, 595.

¹⁵*Bodhimāṇḍasamīpamhi, jāto brāhmaṇamāṇavo -Vijāsippakalāvedī, tīsu vedesu pārago. Mahāvamso, chap. 37-215 / “sopi sattavassiko hutvā vedāni ca uggahetvā sattavassabbantareyeva tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ nipphattiṃ pāpuṇi”*, James Gray, *Buddhaghosuppatti*, trans. (London: Luzac. 1892) 39.

¹⁶Buddhaghosa was born in a small village. It was called ‘Ghosa’ because there were colossal sounds produced often by cowboys. His father’s name was Kesi. He was a chaplain of the king and had mastered the three Veda-s. Once, he came across a knotty statement in one of the Veda and was unable to solve it. At that time, Ghosa explored simply the knot that Kesi failed to comprehend.

¹⁷Gray 47.

¹⁸Henry Clarck Warren, *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosacarya*, ed. (HOS,1989) X.

¹⁹“*Bandhupādāpaccā*” is a considerable argument in this regard. But, it may not be an error made by him. He might have been forced by elders’ sources to provide this kind of definition. Also, the second argument, to me, is not stronger than the earlier one. “*Brunahā*” was defined by Buddhaghosa in a different way than the original form of Brahmin texts. I suppose that from a Buddhist perspective, the commentator has an authority to give different interpretations.

²⁰Mahamitawa Pannarathane & Pahalagama Dhammika, *Pali Adhyayana Vimarshana*, (Colombo:Wijesuriya, 2009) 26.

²¹*Yathā vā pana ghaṭe duddhaṃ pakkhittaṃ dadhibhavati, na catthi ekakālasamavadhānaṃ duddhassa ca dadhissa ca. Evamevaṃ natthi ekakālasamavadhānaṃ hetussa ca paccayassa ca.* E. Hardy, *Nettipakaraṇa*. ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1902) 78.

²²Here it should be remembered that the context in the two teachings are different. But the analogy is apparently the same; “curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes.” Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, (University Press: Cambridge, 1922) 255. / “Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? *Sāṅkhya* says that “as the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate Energy.” Ibid.254

²³Norman 110.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Carr & Mahalingam, 139.

²⁶Ibid

²⁷It is of considerable importance to remember that of the technical names of the six systems of philosophy, only two occur in the classical Upanishads, namely Sāṅkhya and Yoga or Sāṅkhya-yoga., F. Muller Max, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, (London: Longmans, 1899) 111.

²⁸Jarl Charpentier, *Uttaradhyayana*, ed. (Upsala, 1922) chap. 12.

²⁹*Sopi kapilo evaṃ taṃ sāsanaṃ osakkāpetvā kālakato avīcimahāniraye nibbatti.*, Smith, H. *Sutta-nipata-atthakatha*, ed. (London:Pali: Text Society, 1966) 307.

³⁰*Tattha nagaramāpanokāsaṃ pariyesamānā himavati kapilo nāma ghoratapo tāpaso paṭivasati pokkharānīṭṭre mahāsākasaṇḍe, tassavasanokāsaṃ gatā. So te disvā pucchitvā sabbam pavattiṃ sutvā tesu anukampaṃ akāsi. So kirabhummajālaṃ nāma vijjaṃ jānāti, yāya uddham asītihatthe ākāse ca heṭṭhā bhūmiyaṅca guṇadose passati. Athekasmiṃ padese sūkaramigā sīhabyagghādayo tāsetvā paripāṭenti, maṇḍūkamūsikā sappe bhimsāpenti. So te disvā “ayaṃ bhūmippadeso pathaviāgga”nti tasmim padese assamaṃ māpesi. Tato so rājakumāre āha – “sace mama nāmena nagaram karotha, demi vo imaṃ okāsa”nti. Ibid, 353.*

³¹E.H. Jhonston, *The Saundarananda of Aśvaghōṣa*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1928) 1.

³²*Na hi paccakkhato pakatisiddhā kapilassapi isino tassa apaccakkhabhāvassa kāpilehi anuññāyamānattā*, Chatthasangayana, *Pañcappakarana-anu-ṭīkāṭī* (Vipassana Research Institute. 1995) 62.

³³Swami Virupakshananda VI.

³⁴T. W. Rhys Davids, & J. E. Carpenter, *Dīgha-nikāya*. ed. vol. I. (London: Pali Text Society, 1966) 168.

³⁵Maurish Walshe, *The Long Discourses of the Buddha*, trans., (Boston: Wisdom Publication, 1995) 154.

³⁶“*Pakati kho esāti pakatikathā esā*”. Moreover, it illustrates; “*Athassa bhagavā taṃ pakativādaṃ paṭikkhipivā.*” T. W. Rhys Davids, & J. E. Carpenter *Dīghanikāya aṭṭhakathā (Sumanāgalavilāsini)*. eds.vol. I-III. (London: Pali Text Society, 1968) 358. Thus, it is clear the commentator attests that the term ‘*pakati*’ comes in the *Mahasihanada-sutta* signifies a type of religious or philosophical system

³⁷“*Pākaṭabhāvena kāyati gametīti pakati, lokasiddhavādo*” Lily de Silva, *Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā ṭīkā Līnatthavaṇṇanā*, ed. III vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1970) 464.

³⁸“*pittasamuṭṭhānādisamaññā loka siddhattā*,” CSCD, S-ṭ (My. ed II) 361

³⁹“*gahitavattḥūsu vibhāgato gahaṇaṃ lokasiddhavādanti dassetuṃ*” CSCD, M-ṭ (My. ed II) 77

⁴⁰*Taṃ pakativādaṃ paṭikkhipitvāti yaṃ pubbe pākatikaṃ sāmāññaṃ, brahmaññaṃca hadaye ṭhapetvā tena acelakassapena “dukkaraṃ sudukkara”nti vuttaṃ, bhagavatā ca tameva sandhāya “pakati kho esā”tiādi bhāsitaṃ* CSCD, D-abhi-ṭ (My. ed II) 358.

⁴¹A Loka Siddha or World Siddha is one, who has attained all yogic accomplishment, or power over human existence, both physical and psychological, and, as in this instance, is also an adept in the astrological sciences. W.Y. Evans-Wents, *The Tibetan Books of the Great Liberation* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1954) 122.

⁴²<http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.001.than.html>, 30, November, 2013.

⁴³J. H. Woods & D. Kosambi, *Majjhima-nikāya aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī)*, ed. vol. I. (London: Pali Text Society. 1977) 16.

⁴⁴*nibbānaṃ na maññati, nibbānasmimṃ na maññati, nibbānato na maññati, nibbānaṃ meti na maññati*, Trenckner 6.

⁴⁵Swami Virupakshananda stnz. 3.

⁴⁶P.V. Bapat, *Vimuttimaggā and Visuddhimaggā*, (Poona:1937) LVIII.

⁴⁷G. P Mallasekara, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon*, (Colombo: M. D Gunasena, 1958) 86-87.

⁴⁸Oskar von Hinuber, *A Hand Book of Pali Literature* (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1996)126. / Norman has dated that it could be before fourth century A.D., See Norman 133.

⁴⁹Its importance lies in the fact that it was made use of by Buddhaghosa when he wrote the *Visuddhimaggā*. Buddhaghosa does not quote the *Vimuttimaggā* by name, but the author of the *ṭīkā* upon the *Visuddhimaggā* states that the word *ekacce* refers to the *thera* Upatissa who was responsible for proposing a refuted method of classifying temperaments in the *Vimuttimaggā*. Norman 113.

⁵⁰To illustrate the nature of Nāma and Rūpa, Upatissa has given here the simile of drum and sound, as well as that of a blind man and lame man. Bapat113.

⁵¹Noman 113. / M. Nangai, 71.

⁵²“The fourth of these early prose texts which were probably composed in North India is the *Vimuttimagga*, and as will be noted below there is some doubt as to whether this work is still extant.” Norman 113. / Bapat also makes an attempt to stress that this text was from India. Bapat LIV.

⁵³Rhys Davids 596.

⁵⁴von Hinuber 124.

ABBREVIATIONS

Vim	Vimuttimagga
Vism	Visuddhimagga

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