# THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CITY OF SURABAYA INDONESIA

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## ABSTRACT

This article will examine the issue of the development of Islamic Extremism (salafism) related to religious ideological movement in Surabaya, which is the second largest city after Jakarta. The religious life of such puritanical movements is a special concern for the wider community including academics, government officials and local communities. Based on the results of this study we can suggest that the existence of Islamic Extremism (Salafism) in Surabaya is less able to establish itself compared to other cities. This is due to effort of local government to coordinates with local religious leaders, to build harmony between diverse religious communities in the local area. With the strength of this unity and integrity, the religious conflict within the urban community in Surabaya is avoided.

**Keywords:** Islamic Extremism; Salafism; Pluralism; Surabaya

## Introduction

In the Islamic tradition, religious ideology must position itself with reference to its religious doctrines and teachings. But often this creates problems concerning the exclusivity and absolutism of the truth that

comes from the interpretation of these Islamic doctrines and teachings. And as it is widely acknowledged that some of these attitudes contain an ideological veil. They avoid the dialectical processes and demands of deliberative communication, because they are feared that they will lead to resistance.

The phenomenon of exclusivist religious practices among various religious communities in the world becomes a threat to the social integration and cohesion of pluralistic societies like Indonesia. This exclusivist attitude holds that only their opinion is correct and the others are wrong and are a threat. The activities of puritanical and militant actors in the public sphere creates conflicts, as is the current situation in Indonesia.

Indonesia is heavily impacted by diverse Islamic traditions and movements. This is due to its history which involves a dialogue between cultures which resulted in different religious typologies and styles. The possibility of these differences being weaponized or inflamed can lead to a form of a civil war. These more radical groups have various sources: one group follows Middle Eastern culture (Saudi Arabia) as legitimate Islam (Wahabiyah), another follows Puritanical groups from Syria and Iraq, some follow the Shi'a from Iran and some are aligned with groups from India such as Islam Ahmadiyah.

These Islamic groups are increasingly impacting the archipelago, so that Indonesia is faced with several competing Islamic groups, all of which have different religious ideological orientations. Fundamentalist groups such as Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) who follow the ideology of "Khilafah" wish to establish a trans-national Islamic state in Indonesia under the sole leadership of an Islamic caliphate. Similar to HTI, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) aims to establish a regional Islamic state (Southeast Asia) under the leadership of an emir.[3] The problem of such competing factions can be analysed with reference to their interaction within metropolitan area since it is here that they become concentration and compete with one another most intensely. Surabaya provides a instructive laboratory for investigating these frictions and competitions.

In academic studies, it has been stated that the religious typology of a santri community is usually pluralist, tolerant, contextual, hereinafter referred to as moderate when addressing contemporary problems. However, since the post-reformation, the religious nuances of urban society in Surabaya have been more influenced by Islamic fundamentalist groups, which of course tend to be more radical. From the results of this study, it will be possible to describe the factors that cause the transformation of the religious values of urban communities in the city of Surabaya.

**Existence of Urban Community Religious Ideology Movement**

The reform movement in Indonesia in 1998, forced Indonesia to enter a new phase in the process of organizing the life of the nation and state. This phase opened to an increased freedom in public spaces. Not only liberal expression, but also people's desire to return to their traditional identities was very strong, especially ethnic and religious identities. The rise of communal violence in the early years of the transition demonstrated how religious and ethnic preferences create conflict and violence. This gave rise to religious exclusivism and very existence of multicultural society was at stake. The character of exclusivist religious doctrines in the Islamic world can be reduced to four characteristics.[4]

*First*, they tend to approach their scripture literally. The text is strictly treated as an authoritative text, and not discourse, so that it subordinates the historical, sociological, and cultural context of the text. Truth is assumed to exist only in the literal reading of the text. The truth of revelation is approached by grammatical analysis and the meaning of words in the text alone. Revelation is seen as something that is unchanging, final, without alternatives. As a result, the truth of Islam that is presented is no longer visionary; it does not produce new knowledge but merely reproduces past knowledge. This way of thinking is soon easy to form an exclusivist social attitude.[5]

*Second*, it understands reality through a Shari'ah-minded attitude. Islam is considered as an institutional solution for all the problems of the nation. This idea seems to have found its political momentum following

the fall of the New Order and its moral justification in the midst of a multidimensional crisis which they perceive as a result of the secular and capitalistic system.

*Third*, followers often tend to believe in conspiracy theories where Muslims are victims. In this context, the West is believed to always have and carry out a hidden agenda by conspiring to forge political, economic, military, and cultural alliances to eliminate Islam and destroy its people. This belief is based both on a literal-textual understanding of the teachings as well as on the experience of powerlessness in the face of the hegemony of political, military, economic and cultural power of the West which is identified as a product of Judeo-Christian civilization.

*Fourth*, they have a tendency to develop an anti-pluralism agenda. One of the reasons is because they consider the idea of pluralism as originating in the West. In addition, it is also based on the conspiratorial belief that pluralism is a Western ideological way to dismantle Islam as a single truth. To oppose pluralism they believe that Allah (SWT) has created a distinction between "Muslims" and "infidels". With a literal-textual interpretation they assume that the Jews and Christians are a cursed group. The rejection of pluralism which leads to intolerant and pro-violence attitudes is a further consequence of the religious model that embraces this exclusivity.

In the historical record of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, it was stronger from post-independence to post-reform. Since Kartosuwiryo led operations in the 1950s under the banner of Darul Islam (DI), a political movement in the name of religion, it was not long before this movement was overthrown by the New Order. In 1976, Komando Jihat (Komji) emerged, in 1977 the Indonesian Muslim Liberation Front appeared, then followed by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad and others.[6]

The factors for the emergence of radical religious attitudes in multicultural societies are often influenced by several factors. *First* they emerge out of socio-political factors. For instance, the political radicalism movement was reflected in the al-ikhwan al-Muslimin movement in Egypt in 1928 which was pioneered by Hasan al-Banna for whom the return to

true Islam is a necessity. They sought Islamic solidarity, the islamization of modern science, the application of religious law, and the opposing Western culture by the restoration of the caliphate. Al-Banna and his followers pursued the goal of creating a caliphate to achieve social justice and ensure adequate opportunities for all Muslim individuals.[7]

This symptom of violence in the name of religion is more clear when viewed from a socio-political phenomenon than from a religious phenomenon itself. As stated by Azyumardi Azra, that the deteriorating position of Muslim countries in the north-south conflict is the main driver of the emergence of radicalism. Historically, we can see that the conflicts caused by radical groups with a set of violent tools in opposing and clashing with other groups are actually more rooted in socio-political problems. In this case, the Muslim community feels that it is not experiencing the benefits of global civilization, causing resistance to the forces that dominate world civilization, namely the West. They appeal to religious emotions and aim to achieve the "noble" goals of their politics (jihad). The orientation of the Islamic Radical movement is not only in the socio-political field, but also in the political economy, this can be seen in the Islamic Radical movement initiated by the Islamic Jamaat in Afghanistan and Mindanao. They divide religion into two areas, namely the area of teachings and the area of war strategies.[8] Therefore, military training is always seen as the extension of religious teachings. Following this, is is clear that Islamic radicalism is not due to religious motives but socio-political motives faced by Muslims today.

*Second*, the religious emotion factor. The hegemony of Western powers against Islamic countries, whether political, economic, or socio-cultural, inflames the emotions of the world's Muslim community leading to solidarity. This takes the form of the injustice of America and its allies in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, further worsening relations between the West and the East, this has resulted in the disillusionment of Muslims, eventually giving birth to radicalism and violence.[9] Religious emotions that are uncontrollable and easily ignited with by issues of injustice. Messages of religious wisdom and even the advice of religious advocates

to control their passions are helpless in the face of emotional flare-ups that are justified in the name of God.[10]

*Third*, cultural factors. Cultural differences in social life produce several possibilities. It can create positive social interactions, where interaction creates an atmosphere of harmonious social relations. Or it can lead to negative social interactions arise when social relations are not harmonious due to differences in attitudes toward living together.[11] An ideology is a collection of values, ideas, norms, beliefs, and beliefs (walltanschauung) claimed by a person or group of people that forms the basis for determining attitudes towards political events and social problems. In the case of Islamic fundamentalism is is seen as the basis of the state. Such writers as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutub in Egypt, Abul A'la al-Maududi and Abul Hasan an-Nadwi in Pakistan, M. Natsir in Indonesia. anti-Westernization.[12] Westernization according to him is an ideology that will endanger Muslims by preventing the establishment of Islamic law. For this reason, Western symbols must be destroyed for the sake of upholding Islamic law on earth.

These characteristics can be seen in the radicalism movement of Abu A'la al-Mawdudi (1939 M) which was then continued by Sayyid Qutub (1955 M), one of his doctrines is "modern ignorance". There is a dominant belief in the return of perfect Muslim and the elevation Islam to its true position as the dominant universal belief.[13] The radicalism's strong belief in the truth of the ideological program they carry is also accompanied by an interpretation of the truth of other systems that should be replaced in social movements. Beliefs about the correctness of their programs are often combined "populist" ways to achieve them.[14]

*Fifth*, the government policy factors. The government's inability to improve the political, economic, cultural situation, often leads to frustration and anger among the public. As stated by Amin Rais, one of the emergences of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia was due to public dissatisfaction with government policies during the New Order era which were seen as antagonistic to the existence of Muslim communities in Indonesia.[15] This leads to demands that religion be made the only ideology

for structuring one's life and dispensing with secular ideology.[16] Islam is considered as the only foundation for life that is comprehensive, so all political, legal, and social issues cannot be separated from religion. To revive Islam, *jihad* is needed, this is a sacred duty to fight against the falsehoods, and evils of secular society.[17] Finally there is a rejection and resistance to Western thought. Islam is considered distinct from Western modernity and all ideologies and thoughts originating from the West must be rejected. They assume that the failure of Muslims to build an ideal society is due to the fact that Muslims have turned away from the 'straight path,' and choose a secularist and materialistic Western ideology.[18]

To see the religious attitude of the Islamic exclusivists in Indonesia, we can see from Anthony Giddens's thesis that, the exclusivists who are wrapped up in the religious fundamentalism movement is a problem of conflict between tradition and cosmopolitanism in the era of globalization that occurred in the era of the cold war. Globalization is characterized by chaos and the absence of a single dominant force in world development. The idea of globalization is closely related to cosmopolitanism.[19] Globalization uproots the identity of all human beings, creating confusion. One way out, they chose the fundamentalist path to deal with the values of cosmopolitanism. In the same vein, Manuel Castells stated that religious fundamentalism is a 'defensive reaction' to globalization which has created uncertainty and dissociation of identity.[20]

Some of the characteristics possessed by the exclusivity as mentioned above seem to be a spirit of radicalism and extremism which in turn will threaten the existence of the multi-ethnic, cultural and religious Indonesian society. One of them is the religious harmony that has been fostered both by the government and which was a tradition of Indonesia since before independence. A person's attitude and behaviour towards adherents of other religions is much influenced by his religious understanding. In the study of religions, it is clear that the religious attitude of the inclusivist is different from the religious attitude of the exclusivist. For the inclusivist, salvation can be achieved by those in another religion. The inclusivist also differs from pluralist in terms of its rejection of the

assumption that more than one religion is true. An inclusivist accepts the doctrines of their own particular religion as true and accepts other religions based upon shared principles. In this way, the inclusive wants to position itself as a middle ground between the exclusivist and the pluralist.

In the Islamic world, this inclusivist religious attitude is often expressed by such contemporary thinkers as Fazlur Rahman, who accepst the presence of universal goodness for religions other than Islam, as long as they accept the idea of salvation. This approach places Muslims on an equal footing with other people in achieving the truth.[21] Meanwhile, Seyyed Hossein Nasr said that every religion is basically formed by both the formulation of faith and the experience of faith. Islam, for example, requires one to first have the formulations of faith (*tawhid*) before one can have the experience of faith (*amal shalih*), in the Christian perspective one must first have an experience of faith before the formulation of their faith.[22] This was also conveyed by F. Schuon (a Sufi and the initiator of perennial philosophy), who mapped the character of religions in terms of 'exoteric' and 'esoteric' planes. At the exoteric level, one religion is different from other religions, but in the esoteric level it is relatively the same.[23]

Nurcholis Madjid,[24] responded to Ibn Taymiyyah's view of the idea of universal Islam. By quoting the Qur'an, 3: 83-85, Madjid states that Islam – or more precisely as a term with a generic meaning – is an attitude of submission and submission to God which covers the entire universe. Such teachings were later brought by the prophets, whose core and origin was faith in God Almighty, although historically the socio-cultural manifestos differed. This faith must be based on a conscious rejection of false gods and false belief systems. It should see the role of Islam is as a spreader of mercy and peace for the entire universe. This idea of Islam carries a message of love and world peace. Unlike the Islam promoted by the radicals, which use verses of the Qur'an to promote their narrow idea of "jihad" .

For Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), in the creation of a just, democratic, egalitarian, tolerant and civilized society, there should be no

demarcation and discrimination of religion, ethnicity, race and between groups. All humans are the same. Plurality is a *sunnatullah* that will encourage cooperation, synergy, and collaboration, rather than conflict, agitation, and intrigue. Islam for Gus Dur must be able to realize its slogan as a mercy for all nature.[25] As in the context of a plural and multicultural Indonesia, from the beginning the formation of the nation's character must be directed towards an inclusive religious character. Not merely tolerance within the framework of co-existence, but furthermore one must participate in creating pro-existence social relations in pluralism. This religious attitude requires cooperation between religious communities in dealing with actual problems of life such as poverty, violence, and horizontal conflicts within the framework of fundamental and universal values between religions.[26]

However, it must be realized that the religious understanding of our society still relies on a normative approach, resulting in fertile ground for radical groups. Because the normative approach has put forward an emotional attitude that will lead to dogmatism and fanaticism. It should prioritize an empirical-critical historical and social approach so that religion can provide problem solving tools and not challenge the tradition of pluralism and diversity in Indonesia. The historical dimension can provide lessons learned, both a constructive phenomenon and the destructive results that have occurred, so that this wisdom can benefit humanity in the future. The socio-empirical dimension can provide contextual awareness by referring to actual and comprehensive problem solving.[27]

This is where the historical and social dimensions play a very important role in balancing the normative dimensions so that they can form healthy and inclusive commitments and sentiments demanded by religion to avoid fanaticism. Because the exclusivist reason that believes in and monopolizes a single, undivided truth will protect the sacredness of its faith and religious symbols. This is why minority groups when they feel discriminated against, often resort to violence in the name of their religious beliefs. In response to this, it seems that Arkoen offers a solution in the

form of "religious deideology." Deideology is an attempt to distinguish between authentic religion and religion that is ideologically distorted by radical groups. Authentic religion is an open and tolerant religion, while ideological religion is a religion that is interpreted reductively, manipulatively, and subjectively into a closed and intolerant religion.[28]

To address violence, deradicalization requires the desacralization of the connections between official religions, the legal system, and also the political system which is often manipulated in the direction of theocracy. This desacralization is nothing but a democratization process that gives the people the right to determine their secular political orientation. This process takes a long time because the majority of Muslims in general have not been able to move beyond the theocentric political traditions, namely human autonomy and democratic principles are still considered infidel by fundamentalist groups, while the caliphate system is imposed.[29]

In order for religious life to have a humanistic face, Komaruddin Hidayat and Muhammad Wahyuni Nafis provide the following basic principles for religious understanding: *First,* the acknowledgment of the logic of "the One" can be understood only from diverse religious perspectives and interpretations. This means that the Almighty can be understood by various adherents of religions differently and in various ways, but all of them still refer to one belief that there is only one Almighty. This is the essence of the faith of all religions which are developed by humans in their plurality as a necessary consequence of the Infinite when understood by the finite. *Second*, that multiple interpretations and understandings of the One are only tools or paths leading to the Absolute Essence. This principle is very important because it provides the basis for the necessity of, as well as a preventive measure against absolutist religious traditions and dogma. *Third*, a particular religious experience, although limited, must be believed to have absolute value for its adherents, but this does not mean that there is a justification for coercion on others to follow these beliefs. Religious belief must be accompanied by the recognition that one has a commitment to others outside of ones religious sphere. Religious belief and practice are "relatively absolute".[30]

This view of Islam towards other religions appreciates a difference and diversity of ontological nature. Islam treats other religions as they are, and allows them to be themselves, without reduction and manipulation.

**Interreligious Tolerance and the Role of Religious Leaders**

Surabaya is the second largest city in Indonesia after Jakarta. It is widely known as the 'city of heroes,' owing to the fact that Surabaya was the centre of the resistance against the Dutch army. Surabaya has various ethnic populations, most of which are Javanese, Madurese, and other ethnic groups.

The people of Surabaya City have a distinctive Javanese dialect known as Suroboyoan language. The people of Surabaya are known to be quite proud of their language, however, with time there has been an intermingling of Suroboyo, Javanese Ngoko and Madurese. There is also a very pluralist character to the various religions embraced by the people of Surabaya. Relations between religious adherents are close and warm and involve mutual respect. In art, the people of Surabaya tend to like art that is dynamic, attractive, and humorous. An example is the Remo Dance which is used as an opening dance at the Surabaya Ludruk art stage.

The promotion of pluralism also has a history. To foster inter-religious harmony for ethnic groups in the city of Surabaya, the role of the government, the private sector (social organizations) and the community organize social activities. Religious organizations involved in these activities include the East Java Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB), the Surabaya Interfaith Forum (FLA), the East Java Indonesian Christian Church (GKI), Surabaya Al-Akbar Mosque (MAS), the Maitreya Indonesian Buddhist Pandita Council (Mapanbumi), Muhammadiyah, Niciren Syosu Indonesia, TITD (Tri Dharma Place of Worship) Gresik and a number of non-religious organizations like the Indonesia Vegetarian Society, and the East Java branch of the Indonesian Chinese Association (INTI).

Tree planting is a major activity of cooperation. This was initiated by the Surabaya branch of the Indonesian Buddhist Representative

(Walubi) with the support of a number of religious organizations and businessmen with the Mayor of Surabaya on Sunday, March 30, 2008 at Kupang Indah. This activity inspired by the concern of religious leaders in Surabaya to participate in protecting and preserving the environment. No less than 300 Trembesi trees with a diameter of 4-5 cm were donated and planted by the forum. The activity coordinator said that the desire to plant trees was based on his concern for the global warming phenomenon. In addition, this activity can at the same time strengthen communication between religious communities in Surabaya. The mayor hoped that inter-religious communication can be strengthened by cooperation in such activities. through good communication, religious misunderstanding avoided and communicated.

The cause of social strife in a city like Surabaya can be traced fundamentalist movements biases of religious interpretation. It cannot be denied that the occurrence of changes and even ideological shifts for the Islamic community (fundamentalism) in Surabaya as a rational thing. However, these changes and shifts are coloured by ideological factors; whether there is adjustment to modernity, the acceptance of democratic principles or the adaptation to the public sphere. This is complicated by the fact that Islamic fundamentalism in both its national and trans-national contexts reacts to modernity, and political democracy, because it is perceived as unable to deliver the promises and hopes that it promotes.

The criticism of modernity also concerns the domination and hegemony of the West towards Islam and the Islamic world through the neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism projects. The fundamentalism movement for the Islamic community in Surabaya can be seen as an way to fight Western domination and hegemony, including democracy as a political ideology. Among the followers of this movement, Western democracy is considered a product of Western modernity and cannot be applied in the Islamic world. The resistance to Western modernity is considered an oppressive measure, even though it is seen as important in order to return the Islamic world to the Islamic caliphate system as it was applied at the time of the Prophet.

Departing from the phenomenon that occurred in the religious ideological movement developed by the multicultural society of Surabaya (Islam), it is more appropriate for us to label them that their movements are a response to the ideology of modernism, both in the state constitution, as well as in the socio-religious realm. Fundamentalists see themselves as fighting against what they consider as threatening the roots of Islam's existence, both socio-political, cultural, and religious. Furthermore, they want to make radical changes in the name of their "holy agenda." Fundamentalist Islamic groups in Surabaya emerged through peaceful actions. The orientation and strategy of this fundamentalist group seeks to control society through social action, their movement is far from being revolutionary or violent. Although the character of the revolution was lost, Islamic symbols permeated society and Islamic political discourse. The decline of Islamic progressive Islamic groups in Surabaya as well as progressive Islam in Indonesia, namely they started from a political movement accompanied by the rise of Islam as a social and moral phenomenon. This progressive Islamic group strives for what fundamentalists also believe, an Islamic society based on the goodness of its members. This group can be found with fundamentalists such as the Surabaya branch of Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), whose movement orientation is to build a trans-national Islamic state in Indonesia under the sole leadership of the Islamic caliphate. Similar to HTI, the Surabaya branch of the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) also aims to establish a regional Islamic state (Southeast Asia) under the leadership of an emir.

Radical Islamic groups include the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Laskar Jihad. The orientation of Islamic radicalism is more directed at the application of sharia at the community level, not at the state level. Thus, borrowing Roy's explanation, we can see that there has been a shift in the struggle of the fundamentalists from the islamization of the state (formalization of shari'ah at the state level) to islamization of the application of shari'ah at the family and community level (known as Islamized space). Therefore, both HTI, MMI, FPI, and Laskar Jihad have similarities in their political orientation and both reject secularization, as

well as democracy.[31]

Issues or themes of the caliphate is not a massive movement, but it is a hidden one. This can also have a big impact on the birth of a larger religious fundamentalism movement. In addition, efforts to reveal the various strengths of Islamic fundamentalism in Surabaya are still fragmentary so that they only rely on the emergence of similar symptoms between various distinct fundamentalist movements. If the PKS is the pinnacle of political orientation is that it promotes democracy openness, freedom and political rights for citizens, then it must also be remembered that various fundamentalist movement organizations that form the political basis of PKS.

Islamic movements cannot avoid two basic elements; an ideological orientation with an on the one hand and pragmatic one on the other. As for the academic groups, they choose a style of peaceful actions. The orientation and strategy of this group seeks to influence society through social action, their movement is far from being revolutionary or violent. Although the revolutionary character has disappeared, they still put forward the symbols of Islam permeating the wider community, starting from students and extending to the wider community. These groups are organized such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which is based in campus mosques such as ITS, UNAIR, and some are also at UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya. Their religious attitude is fanaticism, where religion is embraced as a basic guide to life. They emphasize obedience and piety, and do not want to consider other teachings. This leads to an exclusivist attitude which in turn can lead to disharmonious relationships among religious people, especially among the people of the city of Surabaya.

Socio-economic conditions in the city of Surabaya show a significant difference between local residents and immigrants. According to this research, it was found that the economic level of the immigrant population was greater than that of the local population. This is because the immigrant population has higher work mobility, such as the Muslim community in urban areas, where most of the population is ethnic Chinese, while ethnic Madurese and Javanese are quite content to live on the edge

of Surabaya, with a much lower economic level than the Chinese. The existence of economic inequality results in weak social interaction between existing ethnic groups. So that family solidarity will feel threatened by its existence which in the end accumulates a multicultural movement and a ideological religious movements.

Recognizing this phenomenon, in order weaken movements that threaten national solidarity, the government or FKUB together with religious assemblies made all religious communities aware of the importance of inter-religious dialogue to improve the life of its citizens. The factors that promote pluralism in a city like Surabaya are as follows:

*First*, people's perceptions or views of social reality, seems harmonious. In this research we have never found frictions between Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Catholics and Confucians. *Second*, there is an acceptance of differences. The residents of Surabaya City are predominantly Muslim and have been very tolerant of accepting differences, so that the presence of outsiders from different backgrounds is accommodated. This is because the Islamic religion embraced by the natives of the City of Surabaya uphold the attitude of tolerance as the embodiment of their religious teachings. Differences in religion (Catholic, Hindu Christian, Islam and Confucianism) are not considered a challenge but as a part of the wider community. *Third*, there is an awareness of the concept of multiculturalism, as important for creativity and innovation. Acceptance of other groups is also based upon the value of non-interference.[32]

The diversity of ethnicities in the city of Surabaya is not much different from other big cities in Indonesia, namely there is a dominant ethnic group and there are also subordinate ethnic groups. The dominant group in a pluralistic society such as in Surabaya often functions as a "renewal vehicle" for the other ethnic groups. And the subordinate groups often use the culture of the dominant ethnic group for acculturation orientation in shared life. From the beginning, it was certain that the Javanese and Madurese were the first ethnic groups to be the original inhabitants of Surabaya (dominant ethnicity), then followed the presence

of other ethnic groups from various regions outside Surabaya with various beliefs and backgrounds. Their presence involves different motivations and histories.

The cultural pluralism in the city of Surabaya arises from the various diverse ethnicities, Javanese and Madurese and the original Balinese and have the largest presence compared to other ethnic groups. Javanese culture still dominates. In addition to Javanese culture having the largest representation, the dialogue of Islam, Christianity and Hinduism cannot be separated from the character of Javanese culture itself. There is a reciprocal relationship between religion and culture. In addition to ethnic and cultural pluralism, religious pluralism is also very colourful throughout Denpasar City (Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Catholicism, Christianity, and Confucianism). These differences in beliefs and beliefs do not have create disharmony in social life, but create a spirit of togetherness and make the city of Surabaya more vibrant.

*Fourth*, there is local wisdom. Local wisdom in Surabaya, especially on the outskirts of the city, has contributed to the building of civil society in the local areas, especially in terms of inter-religious tolerance. Local wisdom in Surabaya emerges from traditional Javanese and Madurese cultures, as well as the absorption of the teachings of Hinduism which has historically shaped Javanese culture itself. Every local wisdom has an emphasis on a certain values to be guided in the community. There is an emphasis on the value of togetherness, on the value of brotherhood, on the value of sharing the destiny, the value of excellence in the spirit in the struggle for life and the spiritual motivation of religion. All of them are accepted and guide in managing life. Among the many local wisdoms that have been promoted by both clergy, government and society in general, *menyama braya* local wisdom is considered to have strategic value in fostering and developing life together with religious communities. Therefore, the local wisdom of *menyama braya* (Hinduism) has received serious attention from the local government and the wider community in Surabaya.

*Fifth*, socio-political conditions. Democratic socio-political

conditions are certainly one of the ways to build harmony in religious life. Without a democratic socio-political life, the building of religious life is threatened. The tense socio-political conditions in all corners of the region in Indonesia do not seem to have a great impact on political developments in the city of Surabaya.

Yet there are movements which threaten this pluralistic character:

*First*, the attitude of exclusivity and the development of religious sects. Globalization marked by differences in life has encouraged the formation of new definitions of various things and gave rise to diverse life practices. Various dimensions of life undergo redefinition and differentiation occurs widely which shows the relative nature of a social practice. In fact, the ways in which people practice religion also experience changes, not because religion undergoes a contextualization process so that religion is embedded in society, but also because the culture that contextualizes religion is a global culture with different values. In this context, especially in religious phenomena, it is marked by the transformation of knowledge systems, value systems, and systems of religious action. As in the city of Surabaya, today's religious phenomenon has increased sharply with the emergence of several sects that make "spirituality" as the central theme. Starting from local sects such as Dharma Murti, Sandhi Murti, Cakra Naga Siwa Sampurna, to traditions adopted from outside Indonesia, such as Falun Dafa/Falun Gong, Sai Baba, Hare Krisna, Brahma Kumaris, Ananda Marga.

In Islam, fundamentalist groups in the city of Surabaya emerged with the style of peaceful actions. The orientation and strategy of this fundamentalist group seeks to control society through social action, their movement is far from being revolutionary or violent. Although the character of the revolution has disappeared, they still put forward the symbols of Islam permeating the wider community, starting from students, students to the wider community. These groups are organized like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which is based in campus mosques such as ITS, UNAIR. Their religious attitude is fanaticism, where this attitude is a belief that the religion they embrace is a basic life guide and

will give birth to obedience and piety, so they do not want to look at other teachings. This will lead to an exclusivist attitude which in turn can lead to disharmonious relationships among religious people.

*Second*, there is an economic gap. Socio-economic conditions in the city of Surabaya show a significant difference between local residents and immigrants. It was found that the economic level of the immigrant population was greater than that of the local population. This is because the immigrant population has higher work mobility, such as the Muslim community in urban areas, where most of the population is ethnic Chinese, while ethnic Madurese and Javanese are quite content to live on the edge of Surabaya, at a much lower economic level.

**Conclusion**

The increase of extremist religious ideology in urban areas in Surabaya is inseparable from the development of modernism which has had an impact on changes in culture, social, and economics. culture, and politics. The dynamics of change has an impact on the dynamics of culture and politics, which sometimes creates various Islamic revivals in local areas. Since the forms of these movements are very diverse, it is difficult to give a single label to it. Even though these ideological shifts is not so significant, they still are a special concern for some religious leaders and the local government so that these two pillars continue to promote inter-religious unity to foster inter-religious harmony so that this extremist religious ideology does not gain too much power in the midst of a pluralistic society.

# ENDNOTES

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