

Development of an Impact Monitoring System for Petroleum Pipelines

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Abstract

Third party damage to petroleum pipelines can be catastrophic if undetected. This damage results in financial losses, environmental pollution and frequent loss of life as a result of explosion. Therefore the timely detection and location of damages along petroleum pipelines will play a key role in the overall integrity management of a pipeline system.

This paper presents the development and testing of mathematical techniques for locating an impulsive event on a pipeline using the pressure pulse caused by it from measurements made remotely. An impulsive event occurring along a pipeline generates pressure pulses which propagate in both directions and this can be detected and measured by sensors located at different positions along the pipeline. From these measurements the location of the event can be determined.

The theoretical work was validated by experiments using a simulated pipeline.

The experimental work was carried out using an experimental test rig comprising a flexible hose pipe 23 m long and 19 mm diameter with four pressure sensors distributed along the pipe and connected to a data acquisition system.

The experiments were tested using static air in the pipe, and were found to give good results.

Keywords: *Petroleum pipeline, third party damage, impact, event location, pulse propagation.*

Introduction

Pipelines are regarded as one of the surest and safest means of transporting petroleum products (USDOT 2003). Unfortunately, these pipelines are occasionally subjected to natural damages (earthquakes, erosion, etc), or third party mechanical damages (terrorist attacks, vandalism, heavy duty equipment, etc) of which, mechanical damage has been singled out as one of the largest cause of pipeline failure from history (Posakony and Hill 1992, NTSB 1995). Vandalisation here refers to illegal or unauthorised activities that involve the destruction of petroleum pipelines to disrupt supply or the damaging of petroleum pipelines to appropriate crude oil or its refined products for personal use or for sale in the black market

(Akintola 2006). This damage, which occurs mostly in remote areas, is of great concern in developing countries of the world, where third party damages are rampant causing the supply of petroleum products to be disrupted. Even in situations where it had been known that damage has occurred along the pipelines, it has actually been difficult to pin-point the exact location of the damage.

Most of this damage caused by impulsive events generates a pressure pulse that propagates in both directions through the fluid in the pipe. This can be detected and measured at points remote from the event and the measured pulses which contain information about the event can potentially be used to locate and characterize what must have caused it. This information might then be used to assess the damage.

Pipeline Damage Detection

It is quite obvious that pipelines dangers and damage exist from the building of them to their use. They traverse large distances, which makes them vulnerable to damage and their complexity makes it difficult to detect and locate faults. Moreover, this medium of transportation is usually attributed to very sensitive products such as crude oil, natural gas, industrial chemicals, in which an unintended pause in their operation result in the loss of millions of dollars. Thus, it is of great importance to set up reliable mechanisms or systems in keeping a close watch at every inch of their length, in order to sustain normal operation and to prevent losing significant amount of those products. The design and application of pipeline detectors is made around the properties of the product that is being transported and expected nature of damage to the system. There are several methods in use that can detect and locate pipeline damage, ranging from simple visual inspection to complicated satellite based hyper-spectral imaging (Bray 1989, Carlson 1993, Doctor and Dunker 1995, Hosokawa *et al.* 2000, Nakamachi *et al.* 1992, Leis 2003, Jolly *et al.* 1992, Kulp *et al.* 1998, Huebler 2002, Francini *et al.* 1997), each with its own advantages and disadvantages.

Event Location

Locating an event on a pipeline requires the use of two sensors on opposite sides of the event. This paper looks at the location of an event on a pipeline considering a situation without gas flowing through the pipe. With gas not flowing through the pipe, the calculations are quite straight forward. But with flowing gas, it becomes a bit more complex and requires the pulse propagation velocity to be calculated in both directions of the propagating pulse.

Location of an Event on a Pipeline

The location of an event such as impact or explosion along pipelines can be determined from knowledge of the pulse arrival times and

sensor positions. Figure 1 shows schematically a pipeline with three pressure sensors denoted by 1, 2 and 3 at distances x_1 , x_2 and x_3 from some datum. An impulsive event occurs at some unknown location and the pulse generated is recorded by the three sensors, arriving at times t_1 , t_2 and t_3 , respectively. Clearly, if the sensors are spaced at approximately equal intervals the event will be located between the first two arrivals; between sensors 1 and 2 in this case.




Fig. 1. Schematic representation of sensors on a pipeline.

The location of an event on the pipe shown in Fig. 1 maybe determined with respect to either sensor 1 or sensor 2. The pulse propagation velocity can easily be measured from the arrivals at the sensors on the same side of the event, sensor 2 and 3 in this case. If we neglect the effect of gas flow rate which is normally small compared to the pulse propagation velocity, c_p , the exact event location from sensor 1 is calculated by:

$$x_{E1} = \frac{(t_{12}c_p + x_{21})}{2}, \quad (1)$$

or from sensor 2,

$$x_{E2} = \frac{(x_{21} - c_p t_{12})}{2}. \quad (2)$$

Unfortunately, this calculation as simple as it may look is made difficult due to the uncertainties in measurement of the arrival time of the pulses at the sensors. Olugboji (2011) Investigated this and recommended the

the pulse enters the main pipe and sets off in both directions, arriving first at sensor 2, followed by sensor 3, then sensor 1 and finally sensor 4. These times of arrival are associated with the distances of the sensors from the position where the generated pressure pulse enters the pipe.

Sensor 2 is the best possible independent measurement of the event (the pulse as it enters the main pipe) because it is close to it and there will be little distortion/attenuation before the pulse propagating from the tee reaches it. The other three sensors are spread out along the pipe to locate the event.

The position 'a' shown is the region in the pipe wall where the originally generated pressure pulse reflects back to the source (the pulse generator) and on reaching the end wall of the source, is again reflected back into the pipe. This can be seen as the negative pressure unloading pulse appearing at sensor 2 at approximately the same time as the original pulse arrives at sensor 4. This unloading pulse is not used in any of the experimental calculations; neither did it affect any of the results of this work.

Velocity of Pressure Pulse Propagation in Static Air

Referring to Fig. 3, the velocity at which the pressure pulse propagates through the pipe of the rig was determined based on the measured pressure pulses at sensors 3 and 4. These were cross-correlated in Matlab® to estimate the delay between arrival times ($t_{delay,34}$). The velocity of propagation of the pressure pulse was computed as

$$c_p = \frac{x_{3,4}}{t_{delay,34}}, \quad (3)$$

where $x_{3,4}$ is the known distance between sensors 3 and 4. The smallest pressure pulse was generated with 0.2 bar in the pulse generator, and the highest 1.0 bar. A total of 75 measurements (15 each at each pressure in the pulse generator) were taken between these limits and the results are shown in Fig. 4.




Fig. 4. Computed velocities of pulse propagation (the pressure quoted is the pressure in the pulse generator).

Considering the results obtained in Fig. 4, the velocity of pulse can be seen to be proportional to the pressure in the pulse generator. It is reasonable to suppose that this pressure in the pulse generator is proportional to the pulse pressure and so the computed pulse velocity may be said to be proportional to the pulse pressure. The nominal velocity of sound propagation in air at normal temperature and pressure is 343 m/s (Kaye *et al.* 1918). The reason for the discrepancy was not obvious, but it was clearly systematic and repeatable and so it was investigated.

Pressure Related Pulse Velocity

Sonic velocity in a perfect gas such as air is related to temperature through the equation:

$$c^2 = \gamma RT. \quad (4)$$

It was suggested that the rise in pressure within the pulse might have caused a localised temperature rise to account for the increased velocity. To investigate this hypothesis the necessary rise in temperature was calculated:

$$\left(\frac{c_n}{c_p}\right)^2 = \frac{T_n}{T_p}, \quad (5)$$

$$T_p = T_n \left(\frac{c_n}{c_p}\right)^2, \quad (6)$$

where T_p = air temperature within the pressure pulse; T_n = ambient temperature; c_p =

measured pulse propagation velocity; c_n = nominal sound propagation velocity.

Considering a measured pulse propagation velocity of 349 m/s and the speed of sound 343 m/s at 20°C, the value of T_p was obtained using Eq. (6),

$$T_p = \left(\frac{349}{343} \right)^2 \times 293 = 303\text{K},$$

that is, a rise of 10°C. This raised the question: is that quite substantial temperature rise possible?

The compression and subsequent expansion of the air as the pulse passes through it is very rapid, and so it is reasonable to assume it is an adiabatic process. So we may apply the ideal gas law:

$$\frac{P_p V_p}{T_p} = \frac{P_n V_n}{T_n}, \quad (7)$$

where the subscripts p and n refer to the state within the pulse and standard values, respectively, as before.

Furthermore, one may assume constant volume compression/expansion since the air is constrained within a pipe, and so

$$\frac{P_p}{P_n} = \frac{T_p}{T_n} = \left(\frac{c_p}{c_n} \right)^2, \quad (8)$$

$$\therefore P_p = P_n \left(\frac{T_p}{T_n} \right) = P_n \left(\frac{c_p}{c_n} \right)^2. \quad (9)$$

Taking normal atmospheric pressure as 1.0 bar, this gives a pressure of 1.034 bar within the pulse, or a rise of 34 mbar above ambient. This seems quite feasible since the atmospheric pressure can vary by more than 90 mbar due to natural weather conditions (-80 mbar for hurricanes and +15 mbar for anticyclones). It is therefore proposed that the high measured pulse velocities are indeed accounted by change in temperature within the pulses as proposed.

Event Location in Static Air

The calculation of the location of the event on the pipe of the test rig was performed using a program written in the Matlab® m-code language. The estimate of the location of the real event, that is, the point where the original pressure pulse enters the main pipe was

determined from the measured data at sensors 1 and 3 in Fig. 3, and later compensated for the small offset to sensor 2.

This compensation is necessary because the true source of the pulses is the tee joint and this should have formed the basis of all the calculations about the location of the event. The position of the ‘effective event’ (that is, the event apparently occurring at sensor 2) is calculated according to Eq. (2), minus the distance x_{offset} , where x_{offset} is the known distance between sensor 2 and the tee connector. This calculation makes use of the measured value of pulse propagation velocity c_p as given in Eq. (3), and $t_{delay,13}$, the measured delay between arrivals at sensors 1 and 3, computed using the cross correlation technique. Figure 5 shows the spread of the location calculations against the pressure in the pulse generator for the seventy-five tests carried out.




Fig. 5. Event location: Computed estimates in event location.

Figure 5 showed consistency in the computed estimates in the location of the event within the limits of the pulse pressure measurements used. The computed estimates in the location of the event for the 75 measurements taken ranged between 1.770 m and 1.772 m, a scatter of just 2 mm, as against the actual measured event location of 1.760 m. The small discrepancy may be accounted for by the assumption of uniform velocity between the sensors in the calculation.

Conclusion

An accurate method of locating the position of an impulsive event on a pipeline was developed, based on time delay between pulse arrivals at two sensors, measured using cross correlation. The results obtained for event location using this technique showed that it can be applied to real pipeline applications. With the use of static air there was a difference of only 12 mm between the computed and actual locations.

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